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ON ELL4N AND ALIENS:t
A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE
PLENARY POWER PROBLEM
Victor C. Romero*

INTRODUCTION

ELIAN, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND

IlfMMIGRATION POLICY

The poignant story of a little boy fished out of the sea after losing
his mother to the elements' captured the country's imagination and
Except to make a statement in this title, I prefer the terms "noncitizen" to
"alien" and "undocumented immigrant" to "illegal alien" because of the pejorative
connotations attached to the word "alien." E.g., Victor C. Romero, 7he Domestic
FourthAmendment Rights of Undocwnented Immigrants: On Guitterez and the Ton
Law/Immigration Law Parallel, 35 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. RI-v. 57, 59 n.12 (2000)
[hereinafter Romero, Guitterez]; Victor C. Romero, Equal Protection Held Hostage:
Ransoming the Constitutionaliyof the Hostage Taking Act, 91 Nw. U. L REv. 573,
573 n.4 (1997) [hereinafter Romero, Hostage];see also STEPHEN H. LEcoMsKy, ImMIGRATON AND REFuGEE LAW AND PoucY 953-54 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing other
flaws of phrase "illegal alien," not least of which is its imprecision); Kevin R. Johnson, "Aliens" and the U.S. ImnigrationLaws: The Social and Legal Construction of
Nonpersons, 28 U. Miia h~NTE-AM. L. Rv. 263, 268 (1996-97) (discussing "how
the term alien masks the privilege of citizenship and helps to justify the legal status
quo").

* Professor of Law, The Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of
Law. This article has benefited from ideas I first explored in a talk I gave at the First
Annual Latino Symposium at the Columbia Law School in April 1999. The author
also has presented portions of this paper in a panel discussing lessons learned from the
Elidn Gonzflez case at the National Pacific American Bar Association Conference in
Washington, D.C. in October 2000. I would like to thank Bob Ackerman, Jack Chin,
Harvey Feldman, Kevin Johnson, Steve Legomsky, Michael Mogill, and Laura Terry
for their insightful comments on an earlier draft, Dean Peter Glenn for his financial
and moral support of this and many other projects, Raphael A. Sanchez for his excellent research assistance, and most importantly, my wife, Corie, my son, Ryan, and my
family in the Philippines for their untiring love and support.
1. See, e.g., Lisa Arthur et al., 5-Year-Old Survivor Cltng to Inner Tube: Two
More Rafters Rescued, but 11 Other CubansMay Have Died al Sea, Mtau HERAw,
Nov. 26, 1999, at Al; Mike Clary, 5-Year-Old, Two Adults Rescued off FloridaAfter
Cuban Boat Sinks, OREGOmN (Portland), Nov. 26, 1999, at A3; Sue Anne Pressley,
Young Refugee at Center of InternationalDispute: Father,Cuba Want Return of Boy
Rescued at Sea, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1999, at A3; 3 WVito Survived Sinking Won't
Be Deported, N.Y. Taurs, Nov. 27, 1999, at All.
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ignited a political firestorm. 2 The Eliin Gonz~lez saga drew conflicting opinions from nearly every branch of American local, state, and
federal government, from a Florida state court3 and Miami Mayor
Alex Penelas, 4 to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals,5 the United
7
States Congress, 6 and Vice President Al Gore.
Despite the cacophony of voices, two viewpoints surfaced from
above the din. The first, held most strongly by Elien's Miami relatives, was that the boy should have been allowed to file an asylum
petition to live permanently in Miami, far away from the repressive
Castro regime. 8 The second, proffered by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and eventually upheld in court, was that Elin
should have been returned to the custody of his father, who would
then repatriate to Cuba. 9
Along with these opinions came the underlying theories. The
pro-asylum camp asserted the importance of preserving Elin's rights
2. See, e.g., Young Survivor of Boat Sinking a Pawn in U.S.-Cuba Tug-of-War,

Cm. TRm., Nov. 30, 1999, § 1, at 22.
3. See Gonzalez v. Gonzalez-Quintana, No. 00-00479 FC 29, 2000 WL 419688
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 10, 2000) (granting temporary protective order to Eligin's greatuncle), vacated, No. 00-00479 FC 28, 2000 WL 492102 (Fla. Cir. Ct. April 13, 2000)
(vacating order and dismissing case because matter is federally pre-empted).
4. See Peter T. Kilbom, Miami Area's Mayors Ride a Volatile Political Wave,

N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 17, 2000, at A14 ("[At an April 2000 rally,] Mayor Penelas,..
declared that he would not let the Miami police help federal agents move Elin from
his temporary home and would blame President Clinton and Attorney General Janet
Reno for any violence and civil disorder that might occur.").
5. See Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 (1lth Cir. 2000) (affirming district
court's dismissal of suit); Gonzalez v. Reno, No. 00-11424 D, 2000 WL 381901 (11 th
Cir. Apr. 19, 2000) (granting Eliin's motion for injunction not to be removed from
United States pending appeal of Immigration and Naturalization Service's refusal to
consider his asylum application).
6. See, e.g., Karen DeYoung, Battle Over Cuban Boy Moves to Hill: Warring
Factions of Elian Gonzalez's Family Appeal for CongressionalAllies, WASH. POST,
Jan. 28, 2000, at A3; Irvin Molotsky, 2 Officials Urge Congress To Stay Out of Elidn

Case, N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 17, 2000, at A12.
7. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Gore Supporting Residency Status for Cuban Child.

Split in Administration, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 31, 2000, at Al; Jonathan Weisman, Let
Him Stay, Gore Says of CubanBoy: Vice PresidentBreaks with Justice Dept., Clinton
in Elidn Case, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 31, 2000, at IA.
8. See, e.g., Sue Anne Pressley & Karen DeYoung, FederalSuit Filed Over Elian:
Action Alleges Reno, INS Chief Violated Cuban Boy's Rights, WASH. POST, Jan. 20,

2000, at A5.
9. See Memorandum from Bo Cooper, INS General Counsel, to Doris Meissner,
INS Commissioner 2 (Jan. 3, 2000), availableat http:llwww.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/

publicaffairs/elian.pdf [hereinafter Cooper Memo] ("Since there is no objective basis
to believe that Elidn is at risk of persecution or torture, the INS should not accept his
asylum application against the expressed wishes of his father.").
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against a cold and arbitrarily-enforcedo immigration law that does not

often consider the humanity of noncitizens of the United States." The
other side decried the human rights arguments as a smokescreen proffered by anti-Castro forces who would flaunt the rule of law and use a

little boy as a pawn in a political chess game.' 2
Despite the author's armchair interest in this case, 13 this article

takes no specific position on Elidn's situation.14 Rather, this article
values the Gonzdlez story for putting a human face on often faceless
legal issues. More specifically, Elidn's saga raises the following important question: When should the right of the human being to be
treated as an individual trump the right of government to decide how

to effectively manage the influx of groups of people into this country
through the immigration laws?

In previous writings, the author has argued that immigration law
should be as concerned with individual constitutional rights as other
bodies of domestic law.1 5 This article builds upon this earlier work,
and perhaps deviates slightly' 6 by suggesting that, given the forthcoming demographic shift in America's population from white to non-

white, many of whom are new citizens, the most effective means of
10. Apparently, the INS has allowed other children in Elidn's position to petition
for asylum. See id. at 8-9 (distinguishing Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731 (7th Cir.
1985), in which INS accepted asylum claim of 12-year-old).
11. See infra Part I for a discussion of the plenary power problem.
12. See, e.g., Editorial, Elidn v. Fidel: A 5-Year-Old Sun'irorHas Become a Paiwn
in a Cynical PoliticalGame, Posr-STANmA
(Syracuse), Dec. 2, 1999, at A14.

13. Unlike other commentators, this author can claim no specific expertise in either
asylum or family law surrounding custody issues and, indeed, has been interviewed
only once by the press on this case. Telephone Interview between Martha Irvine,
Associated Press, and Victor Romero (Apr. 21, 2000) (discussing legal aspects of
Gonz~Iez case).
14. The author sees both sides of the argument. On the one hand, a boy, despite his
youth, should be appointed a guardian to pursue his asylum claim on its merits especially where, as here, his Miami relatives have become subjects of persecution by the
Castro regime. On the other hand, assuming Elidin's father has not been coerced by
the Cuban government, his parental rights to raise his child as he sees fit include
returning him to live in Cuba, effectively forbidding the filing of Eliin's asylum
claim.
15. See Victor C. Romero, The Congruence PrincipleApplied: Rethinking Equal
Protection Review of FederalAlienage ClassificationsAfter Adarand Constructors,

Inc. v. Pefia, 76 Op- L. REv. 425 (1997) [hereinafter Romero, Congruence];Victor C.
Romero, Expanding the Circle of Membership by Reconstrcting the "Alien": Lessons from Social Psyclology and the "Promise Enforcement" Cases, 32 U. Miciu.

J.L. REomi 1 (1998) [hereinafter Romero, Erpanding];Romero. Guitterez, supra
note t; Romero, Hostage, supra note t.
16. Many of the prior pieces advocate changes in the way the judiciary protects
immigrants' rights, whereas this article looks to the political branches of government
for effective policy reform. See, e.g., Romero, Congruence, supra note 15; Romero,
Hostage, supra note t; Romero, Guitterez, supra note t.
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changing immigration policy might be through the political branches
of government and not through the judiciary. t 7 Because of the federal
judiciary's continued reluctance to strictly scrutinize individual rights
claims that arise out of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),18
17. Similar arguments were raised in Kevin Johnson's thoughtful symposium contribution to the La Raza Law Journal in 1995. See Kevin R. Johnson, Civil Rights
and Immigration: Challengesfor the Latino Community in the Twenty-First Century,
8 LA RAZA L.J. 42 (1995) [hereinafter Johnson, Civil Rights]. However, this article
takes a slightly different tack by evaluating the importance of a political strategy for
both Latinos and Asians in light of the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements

vis- -vis the individual rights claims raised in Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998),
and Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999). See

inifra Part I.B.
18. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration,
Congress,and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925 (1995) [hereinafter Legomsky, Ten More Years]. At one level, the Rehnquist Court's continued deference to

Congress's plenary power over constitutional immigration matters is notable given its
recent championing of states' rights and federalism, especially in its Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking
federal gun control act as exceeding commerce clause power); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking civil law provision of Violence Against Women
Act); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (striking application of federal

arson statute to private dwelling). While one might argue that immigration law cannot
be the subject of a states' rights approach because of the lack of a state "immigration
system," there are at least two responses to such a claim. First, many state laws are
passed in an effort to affect immigration into the state, the most notorious of which is
perhaps California's Proposition 187, which sought to curtail public benefits to undocumented immigrants. See, e.g., Lolita K. Buckner Inniss, California'sProposition
187-Does It Mean What It Says? Does It Say What It Means? A Textual and ConstitutionalAnalysis, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 577 (1996). When challenged under equal
protection, such state acts have typically been subject to strict scrutiny for discriminating against individuals on the basis of their alienage. See Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971). A states' rights approach might suggest some lesser level of scrutiny
for such acts. And, second, a justification for more deference towards the states might
be that, as a practical matter, immigrants do not immigrate to the United States generally; rather, groups of immigrants relocate to specific areas of the United States. See,
e.g., ROGER DANIELS, COMING TO AMERICA: A HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION AND
ETHNICITY IN AMERICAN LIFE 19 (1990) ("Whereas one generalizes about migration
from Europe, from England, and from Italy going to the New World, to the American
colonies, and to the cities of the northeastern United States, the fact of the matter is
that migration often follows more precise patterns, often from a particular region, city,
or village in the sending country to specific regions, cities, or even specific city blocks
in the receiving nation."). The first major German migration in 1683, for instance,
resulted because villagers from Krefeld decided to move en masse to establish what is
now Germantown, Pennsylvania. Id. Given that the six states which receive the largest number of immigrants are California, New York, Texas, Florida, New Jersey, and
Illinois, it can be argued that the federal government should allow these disproportionately burdened jurisdictions more leeway to pass legislation that affects immigrants
short of barring them from migrating to the area. MICHAEL Fix & JEFFREY S. PASSEL,
IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANTS: SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT

29 (1994). The po-

litical charge surrounding Proposition 187 reflected that sentiment. See, e.g., Kevin
R. Johnson, An Essay on ImmigrationPolitics, PopularDemocracy, and California's
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an effective alternative to litigating such claims would involve seeking
change in the nation's immigration policy itself through statutory reform of the INA. Since the Supreme Court will likely defer to Congressional action in this area, new pro-immigrant laws may well
withstand constitutional challenge.19
Part I of this article describes the difficulty in trying to effect

substantive constitutional changes in immigration policy through judicial action. From Chae Chan Ping20 in 1889 to Reno v. AmericanArab Anti-DiscriminationCommittee21 (AADC) in 1999, the Supreme

Court has typically deferred to Congress in the area of immigration.
Despite its unwillingness to defer to Congress in other areas of consti-

tutional law, especially those involving so-called "states' rights,' 'z the
Rehnquist Court has showed no signs of curbing Congressional power
over non-U.S. citizens.3

Part II presents a political alternative to the

judicial solution. By taking advantage of their majority population
status, Latino- and Asian-Americans, many of whom were former imProposition187: The PoliticalRelevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70

NVAsH.

L. Rnv. 629 (1995); see also infra note 119 and accompanying text (describing racial
prejudice behind anti-immigrant sentiment). That having been said, the author firmly
believes that just as the Rehnquist Court has been incorrect in failing to defer to
Congress in the Commerce Clause arena, it would be a mistake to allow more state
control over immigrants' rights matters because judicial activism is most appropriate
in cases where the Court seeks to protect the rights of discrete and insular minorities.
See generally JoHN HART ELY, DmocizAcy AND DIsTusT 103 (1980) ("Malfunction
[of our representative democracy] occurs when .. representatives beholden to an
effective majority are systematically disadvantaging some minority ... .
19. See, e.g., Romero, Congruence, supra note 15.

20. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
21. 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
22. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (striking civil law provision of Violence
Against Women Act as exceeding Congressional Commerce Clause power); Jones,
529 U.S. at 859 (striking application of federal arson statute to private dwelling). See
also Steve France, Laying the Groundwork, A.B.A. J.,
May 2000, at 40 (discussing
recent cases protecting states' rights).
23. The Ninth Circuit has recently reaffirmed its status as a pro-immigrants' rights
appellate court. See, e.g., United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir.
2000) (curbing INS race profiling practices); Ma v. Reno 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000)
(deciding INS lacks authority to indefinitely detain alien); United States v. PachecoMedina, 212 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding alien arrested after just crossing border did not enter U.S.). However, the Supreme Court has not looked favorably upon
the Ninth Circuit either within or without immigration law. See, e.g., Marybeth Heraid, Reversed, Vacated, amd Split: The Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the
Congress, 77 OR. L. REv. 405,407 (1998) ("In the 1996-97 Term, the Supreme Court
issued opinions in almost ninety cases. During this time, the Supreme Court took
twenty-eight cases from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and reversed twentyseven."). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently favored the decisions of the Fourth
Circuit, upholding many of the latter's decisions. Perhaps the most popular recent
affirmance was the 5-4 vote striking down Congressional action that would have allowed civil lawsuits against women's attackers. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
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migrants, could effect significant change in immigration policy by exploiting the plenary power doctrine to their own ends. Congressional
adoption of immigrant-friendly legislation will survive judicial scrutiny because of the Supreme Court's commitment to Congressional
deference in the field. Part II also suggests and rebuts criticisms of
this political proposal.
Finally, this article concludes by briefly returning to the Elin
Gonzlez case to put the issues raised in proper perspective. Because
the short-term political and litigation strategies adopted by the proElin-in-America forces ultimately failed, perhaps a longer-term political strategy of advocating enhanced asylum rights for all children
might prove a more productive course for the pro-immigrants' rights
lobby.
I
CONGRESS'S PLENARY POWER
AND THE SUPREME COURT'S RESTRAINT

A.

Foundations of Plenary Power: Chae Chan Ping to Mezei

The difficulty in judicially protecting individual rights of noncitizens in the context of immigration policy stems from the Supreme
Court's recognition of the so-called plenary power of Congress over
immigration matters. Even though the federal Constitution specifically vests Congress with the power to create a uniform rule of naturalization, 24 the document is silent with respect to Congress's role
over the admission and expulsion of noncitizens. 25 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court has implied Congress's power over immigration by
reference to the Naturalization Clause, to other explicit powers over
foreign relations and commerce, and to the structure of the Constitution itself.26 Still, that Congress has power over immigration says
nothing about its extent, especially when a noncitizen's rights might
be at issue. A brief review of the Supreme Court's alienage jurisprudence suggests that, by and large, the Court has deferred to Congres24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
25. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PRO.
CESS AND POLICY 178 (4th ed. 1998) ("[Ihe Constitution of the United States includes no language that expressly grants Congress such authority."); LEGOMSKY,
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POuCY, supra note t, at 8 ("And nowhere does
the Constitution expressly authorize the federal government to regulate
immigration.").
26. See ALEINKo ETAL.,
zr
supra note 25, at 185-95 (outlining various arguments
as to sources of Congress's immigration power); LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATiON AND REF.
UGEE LAW AND POLICY, supra note t, at 8-12.
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sional directives in the area of immigration law and policy over the
past hundred years. 27
The genesis of the plenary power doctrine lies in the infamous
1889 Chinese Exclusion Case, or Chae Chan Ping v. United States.2

In that case, the Supreme Court upheld Congressional revocation of
entry permits to Chae Chan Ping, a Chinese laborer who had temporarily left the United States in reliance on those re-entry documents. Af-

ter recognizing that the power to exclude noncitizens is incidental to
national sovereignty, the Court concluded that "[w]hatever license,
therefore, Chinese laborers may have obtained, previous to the act of
October 1, 1888, to return to the United States after their departure, is
held at the will of the government, revocable at any time, at its pleasure." 29 The Court further noted that it could not second guess Con-

gress's decision to enact a race-based exclusionary policy, stating that
such "determination is conclusive upon the judiciary. '30
Chae Chan Ping is an especially important case because just
three years prior, the Court had recognized that the Chinese could

avail themselves of the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause to protect themselves against invidious racial discrimination. In Yick Wo v.

Hopkins,31 the Court overturned a conviction of a Chinese national for
violating a San Francisco safety ordinance regulating the operation of
laundries. The evidence clearly showed that variances were granted to

all but one of the non-Chinese operators, while all of the Chinese-run
laundries had been ordered closed.
27. Because this history is so familiar to most, this discussion will focus primarily
on the major cases over the past hundred years. For more on this history, see SrmntE

H. LEGomSKY, INMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND PoLIIcs IN BRrTAix AND
AmvrcA 177-222 (1987) [hereinafter LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRAMON AND THE JUDICIARY]
(discussing history of plenary power doctrine); Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last
Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46
UCLA L. REv. 1 (1998); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sorereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARv. L. R v. 853
(1987); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principleof Plenary CongressionalPower, 1984 Sup. CT. REv. 255; Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of
Immigration Lmv, 84 CoLum. L. REv. 1 (1984). Recently, Jack Chin has argued that
the plenary power doctrine is not as exceptional as other scholars have suggested and
that the harsh results wrought by its application have parallels in domestic constitutional law. See Gabriel J. Chin, Is There A Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative
Apology and Predictionfor Our Strange but Unexceptional ConstitutionalImmigra-

tion Law, 14 GEO.

IMNIGR.

L.J 257 (2000).

28. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
29. Id. at 609.
30. Ild. at 606.
31. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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Read together, Chae Chan Ping and Yick Wo indicate that the
Court was willing to defer to legislative and executive action in the
realm of immigration policy, but not outside of it. As Alex Aleinikoff,
David Martin, and Hiroshi Motomura have noted:
On the one hand, the Chinese Exclusion Case is a seminal case for
the "plenary power doctrine"-which severely limits [noncitizens']
constitutional rights when it comes to entering and remaining in
this country. In contrast, Yick Wo suggests that [noncitizens] and
citizens receive similar (but not necessarily identical) constitutional
treatment in nonimmigration matters. Put differently, our constitutional law relating to immigration may differ from our constitu32
tional law relating to noncitizen immigrants.

Because Yick Wo focused on nonimmigration issues, the Court
was free to develop the plenary power doctrine in immigration law as
33
it saw fit. In its 1893 decision in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
the Court built upon the foundation laid in Chae Chan Ping by upholding a Congressional statute requiring Chinese nationals (and only
Chinese nationals) 34 to register with the federal government or face
deportation. While recognizing the constitutional limits placed on
government conduct by cases such as Yick Wo, the Court quickly added that because "they continue to be aliens.... [the Chinese respondents] remain subject to the power of Congress to expel them, or to
order them to be removed and deported from the country, whenever in
its judgment their removal is necessary or expedient for the public
35
interest."
While these race-based exclusionary rules generally abated from
the late 1800s through World War 11,36 the 1950s saw the return of the
plenary power doctrine in three decisions that squarely pitted individual claims to both procedural and substantive constitutional rights
against Congress's plenary power over immigration. This time, racial
32. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 25, at 197 (emphasis in original).
33. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
34. Indeed, one of the most frustrating and fascinating aspects of the case is that

Fong Yue Ting was required to present a non-Chinese witness to attest to his lawful
presence in this country for the noncitizen registration certificate to issue. Because

Fong Yue Ting presented a Chinese witness, the collector of internal revenue deemed
the witness not credible and refused to issue the certificate to him. Id. at 703. For
more case analysis of the historical "white witness" requirements, see generally IAN F.
HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE

(1996).

35. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 724.
36. Unfortunately, the abolition of the National Origins Quota system did not occur
until 1965, although there was a steady decline in race-based exclusionary law from
about 1934 forward, when the Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed. See generally

Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to ImmigrationLaw: A New Look
at the Immigrationand NationalityAct of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REv. 273, 279-97 (1996).
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prejudice was not the underlying reason for individual exclusion; instead, the fear of communism drove Congressional action.
In the first case, United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,37
the noncitizen wife of a United States citizen was barred entry into the
United States based on classified information obtained by the govern-

ment, which, it was later revealed, suggested that she had Communist
affiliations. 38 Knauff argued before the Supreme Court that exclusion

without a hearing compromised her due process rights. In rejecting
this argument and reaffirming Congress's plenary power over immi-

gration matters, the Court issued a chilling pronouncement: "Whatever
the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an
alien denied entry is concerned." 3 9 Even considering the country's
anti-Communist mood at the time, the extent to which the Court was
willing to defer to Congress in Kzauff was noteworthy, if not surpris-

ing. Knauff, after all, wanted only an opportunity to be heard, yet the
Court was unwilling to grant even that to the noncitizen spouse of a
United States citizen. 4°
Nonetheless, supporters of individual rights could have taken solace in the fact that Kzauff s impact might arguably be limited in two
37. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
38. For more on Knauff's story in her own words, see EtaLm R,,. KNAuWF,
TkE EuE KNAUFE STORY (1952); see also Charles D. Weisselbvrg, The Erclusion
mid Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz MAezi,
143 U. PA. L. REv. 933, 955-64 (1995).
39. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 544.

40. See generallyLenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: CongressAttacks the Right
to JudicialReview of Immigration Proceedings,29 CONN. L. Rv. 1411 (1997) (discussing constitutionality of Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996's (IIRAIRA) "court-stripping" provision); Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed
Reforms, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1936 (2000) (discussing how these laws are inconsistent
with core immigration policies such as the protection of family integrity); Romero,
Expanding, supra note 15 (calling for repeal of court-stripping provisions of IIRAIRA
based on review of social psychology research on negative noncitizen stereotypes). It
is no small irony that Congress would deny entry to a spouse when one of the underlying policies for the immigration code is to unify families. See, e.g., LEGomsry, ImItGRATION AmD REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY, supra note t,at 131 ("Since [the 1952
Immigration Act], one central value that our immigration laws have long promoted,
albeit to varying degrees, is family unity."). Nonetheless, the federal courts' unwillingness to review hearing-stripping decisions of the political branches finds a contemporary parallel in the IIRAIRA, section 1252(g) of which provides:
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION. - Except as provided in this section and
notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from
the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings.
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against the alien under [the

INA].
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (1994).
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respects. First, Knauff did not involve the abrogation of any substantive constitutional rights, only proceduralones. If the Knauff court
had dealt with Knauff s claim that she had been deprived of her First
Amendment right to free speech, for example, it would have presumably given greater weight to that substantive claim than to Knauff s
procedural assertion that she was not granted an opportunity to be
heard. Indeed, after the Supreme Court rendered its decision, administrative hearings were held and eventually the Board of Immigration
41
Appeals found Knauff admissible on the merits.
Second, the Knauff opinion upholding the denial of a hearing
might arguably have applied only to first-time entrants to the United
States. For instance, one might argue that a long-time resident of the
United States who returns from a temporary trip abroad should be entitled to greater procedural rights than Knauff, a person seeking entry
into the country for the first time.
However, in the three years following Knauff, the Court expanded Congress's plenary power in two important cases. In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,42 the Court filled the Knauff gap between
procedural and substantive rights by denying noncitizens' claims on
substantive constitutional law grounds. A year later, in Shaughnessy
v. U.S. ex rel. Mezei, 43 the Court extended its Knauff holding to deny
the procedural due process claim of a long-time U.S. resident seeking
reentry.
In Harisiades,the Court approved the removal44 of three former
Communist Party members who were rendered deportable under a recently enacted Congressional act. Passed after the petitioners had quit
the Communist Party, the statute made deportable any individual who
had ever advocated the violent overthrow of the U.S. government.
The petitioners did not dispute the government's assertion that the
Communist Party adhered to that belief, and they were accordingly
adjudged deportable. The petitioners' citations to the Due Process
Clause, the First Amendment, and the Ex Post Facto Clause notwithstanding, the Court upheld the law, finding violations of none of these
45
three substantive constitutional provisions.
41.

LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY,

supra note f, at 47

n.8.

42. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
43. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
44. As in the IIRAIRA, "removal" has replaced "deportation" as the term of art,
although "deportation" is more commonly found in the literature. IIRAIRA, Pub. L.
104-208, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-587-97 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
45. Harisiades,342 U.S. at 584.
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Harisiades thus appeared to preclude substantive constitutional
rights claims left open by the Knauff Court's procedural approach.
After Harisiades,not only could Congress deny an individual noncitizen the right to a hearing, it could retroactively apply a new deportation law to remove a noncitizen whose affiliation with the offending
organization had already ended! In language tracking that seen in
other plenary power cases, the Harisiades Court justified this abrogation of the petitioner's substantive rights by stating that it was not its
role, but that of the political branches, to formulate immigration policy
and, therefore, any grievances arising out of such policy should be
addressed to those bodies:
We think that, in the present state of the world, it would be rash and
irresponsible to reinterpret our fundamental law to deny or qualify
the Government's power of deportation. However desirable worldwide amelioration of the lot of aliens, we think it is peculiarly a
subject for international diplomacy... Reform in this field must
be entrusted to the branches of the Government in control of our
46
international relations and treaty-making powers.
Just as the Court extended the plenary power doctrine to reach
substantive claims in Harisiades,it also broadened the Knauff holding
in Mezei by curtailing procedural due process for a long-time United
States resident.4 7 Mezei, a U.S. resident for 25 years, was denied readmission into the country after leaving temporarily to visit his ailing
mother in Romania. Upon his return, he was detained on Ellis Island
as excludable, ostensibly for national security reasons, and therefore
sought admission elsewhere. After he was denied entry in over a
dozen countries, Mezei advised the INS that he would no longer seek
to depart. He then challenged his confinement on Ellis Island without
a hearing as a denial of due process 4 8
The District Court and Court of Appeals granted Mezei's request
for a hearing, perhaps signaling limits on Congress's heretofore plenary power over immigration or, alternatively, the decline of the "red
scare."4 9 In addition, these decisions renewed the hope that some constitutional individual rights claims could survive Knauff and
Harisiades.
However, upon appeal to the Supreme Court, Mezei followed
precedent, and the Court overturned the lower courts' decisions. After
46. i at 591.
47. 345 U.S. at 215-16.
48. Id. at 209.

49. See Michael Scaperlanda, Are We That Far Gone?: Due Processand Secret
Deportation Proceedings,7 STAN. L. & PoL'y REv. 23, 23-25 (1996).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy

LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 4:343

the Court recited the facts, its first statement was a reaffirmation of the
plenary power of Congress followed by a citation to the four cases
described above-Chae Chan-Ping, Fong Yue Ting, Knauff, and Harisiades: "Courts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude
aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from judicial control." 5 0
While acknowledging that departing noncitizens may avail themselves
of procedural due process protections, the Court appeared to characterize Mezei not as a returning twenty-five-year resident, but as "an
alien on the threshold of initial entry. ' 5 1 As such, Knaiff s deferential
standard of judicial review applied to the Attorney General's actions
here: "'Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due
process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned." 52 Despite the
attempts by Justices Jackson and Black in dissents to distinguish
Knauff by emphasizing that, unlike Knauff, Mezei was actually detained at Ellis Island and therefore deserved at least a hearing on the
merits,5 3 the Court would not be dissuaded. As in the two other "anticommunist" era cases-Knauff and Harisiades-thestigma attached
to suspected Communist affiliations played an apparent role in the
Court's findings. For example, in distinguishing Mezei's case from
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,5 4 which had recognized that lawful permanent residents deserved due process protection when returning from
a temporary sojourn abroad, the Court specifically mentioned Mezei's
nineteen months behind the "Iron Curtain" as cause for suspicion. 55
Just as Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting appeared to have been
driven by nativistic sentiments fueled by race prejudice against the
Chinese, 56 Knauff, Harisiades, and Mezei were decided under the
specter of the burgeoning Cold War, when allegations of Communist
affiliation were, for noncitizens, scarlet letters that could lead to summary exclusions.
50. 345 U.S. at 210 (citing Chae Chan Ping, Fong Yue Ting, Knauff, and
Harisiades).
51. Id. at 212.
52. Id. (quoting Knauff, 338 U.S. at 544).
53. 345 U.S. at 227 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen indefinite confinement becomes the means of enforcing exclusion, it seems to me that due process requires that
the alien be informed of its grounds and have a fair chance to overcome them."); id. at
217 (Black, J., dissenting) ("I join Mr. Justice Jackson in the belief that Mezei's continued imprisonment without a hearing violates due process of law.").
54. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
55. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 214. For more on Mezei, see Weisselberg, supra note 38, at
964-84.
56. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 27, at 12-13.
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Regardless of the infamous historical context in which the Su-

preme Court operated from the late 1800s through the early 1950s, all
five decisions discussed firmly established the plenary power doctrine

as part of American law. As the next section demonstrates, recent
Supreme Court decisions in the area of constitutional immigration law

have not proved particularly promising for immigrants' rights advocates. While the Court's 1998 decision in Miller i Albright57 suggests that a slim majority of the Court might be willing to entertain a

constitutional equal protection claim within the context of immigmation law, it appears that such claims may be brought only by citizens

and not by noncitizens. The section concludes that, because of demographic shifts that will establish a non-white, recent immigrant citizen
majority, the more promising solution to the plenary power problem
might be found in the halls of Congress and the White House rather
than in the Supreme Court.
B.

The 1980s, 1990s and Beyond: Continued Judicial Restraint

Three Supreme Court cases from the 1980s and 1990s demonstrate the resilience of the plenary power doctrine and suggest its continued vitality through the twenty-first century. 58 These three cases61
Landon v. Plasencia,5 9 Miller v. Albright,6 0 and Reno v. AADC 57. 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
58. Of the few Supreme Court cases from the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s that protect
noncitizens' rights, none appears to weaken the plenary power doctrine for two reasons. Fst, in one group of cases, the Court chose to protect noncitizens' rights
through the use of statutory norms, not through the vehicle of constitutional due process, because of the constraints imposed by Knatff and its progeny. See, e.g., LEmo.NtSKY, IZ11GRATON AND THE, JUDICIARY,

supra note 27, at 155-70; Hiroshi Motomura,

The Curious Evolution of Imigration Law: ProceduralSurrogatesfor Substantive
ConstitutionalRights, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1625, 1645 (1992) ('The few judicial decisions [of the 1950s and 1960s] that fostered the expansion of procedural due process
review did so primarily through statutory interpretation, not constitutional law."). See
also Hiroshi Motomura, hmnnigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom ConstitutionalNorms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE U. 545 (1990).
And, second, as mentioned in the discussion of Yick Wo above, the Supreme Court
would not defer to the political branches as readily in areas outside immigration law,
especially where the states discriminated against noncitizens qua noncitizens. See,
e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). For a more thorough discussion of the "inside" versus "outside" immigration dichotomy and the federal versus
state alienage discrimination divide, see generally Romero, Congruence, supra note
15. Because these cases do not seriously undermine the plenary power doctrine, and
because the focus of this section is to demonstrate the resilience of the doctrine over
time, this article ill not discuss the aforementioned cases but recommends the citations herein to the reader.
59. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
60. 523 U.S. 420 (1998). As this article goes to press, the Court will decide
Nguyen v. INS, which revisits the constitutionality of the same statute that spawned
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appear at first blush to distance themselves from the more stringent
plenary power decisions of the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth century, yet they reaffirm their central feature by highlighting the deference the judiciary must show to the political branches in immigration
matters.
In Landon, the Court had an opportunity to revisit its 1950s procedural due process jurisprudence vis-ti-vis noncitizens, citing Knauff,
Kwong Hai Chew, and Mezei. The Landon Court remanded for further review the case of a legal permanent resident who was summarily
excluded from reentering the U.S. after returning from a two-day visit
to Mexico. The government contended that because she had knowingly abetted the undocumented immigration of others, Plasencia
could be summarily excluded under the immigration code. 6 2 While
the Court ruled that Plasencia was not entitled to a full deportation
hearing, it held that she was not denied due process.
Citing Kwong Hai Chew and distinguishing Mezei, the Court
held that Plasencia could avail herself of procedural due process protections. As in Kwong Hai Chew and Mezei, Plasencia was a returning permanent resident; however, the Court distinguished Mezei
on the ground that Plasencia was out of the United States for a scant
two days, while Mezei had been away much longer. Nonetheless, the
Court took pains to circumscribe its characterization of Mezei, stating
that it "need not .. decide the scope of Mezei. '' 63 Finding Kwong
Hai Chew controlling, the Court held that procedural due process
norms protected Plasencia, but remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit
instead of deciding whether the process given Plasencia was
constitutional. 64
As intimated earlier, Landon appears to be a chink in the plenary
power doctrine's armor, but it might end up being a very small one.
By ruling that Plasencia, a longtime permanent resident, was entitled
to procedural due process, the Court seemed willing to restore some
constitutional due process protection to noncitizen claimants eroded
the multiple opinions in Miller. Nguyen v. INS, 208 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2000), cert.
granted, 121 S. Ct. 29 (Sept. 26, 2000) (No. 99-2017).
61. 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
62. 459 U.S. at 32-35.
63. Id. at 34. In Rafeedie v. INS., 880 F.2d 506, 519-24 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the D.C.
Circuit clarified this point by suggesting that the deprivation of procedural due process might be permissible when applied to returning permanent residents whose trips
outside the country had been sufficiently lengthy.
64. Landon, 459 U.S. at 37 ("We remand to the Court of Appeals to allow the
parties to explore whether Plasencia was accorded due process under all of the
circumstances.").
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by earlier decisions in Knauff and Mezei. On the other hand, the
Court's refusal to state what process was due Plasencia, its conclusion
that she was not entitled to the formal protections of a full deportation
hearing, and its remand to the lower courts for further discussion suggest a reluctance to fully protect individual rights even in the face of a
65
rather sympathetic plaintiff.
The Court's 1998 Miller v. Albright decision is perhaps more enigmatic than Landon. In Miller, the Court rendered a fractured six-tothree decision where no opinion mustered more than three votes (indeed, the two dissenting opinions were the threesomes).6 6 Lorelyn
Penero Miller, the daughter of a Filipina mother and American father
who had never married, challenged a provision in the INA that required U.S. citizen fathers, but not mothers, to assert their paternity
within 18 years of the child's birth. Miller's primary argument was
that this was a form of unconstitutional gender discrimination built
into the immigration code, especially given the enhanced scientific
methods of proving paternity today that made the INA provision appear to endorse the outmoded stereotype of the uncaring father. The
Court upheld the statute with six justices issuing three different opinions to justify the holding.
Justice Stevens, writing for himself and Chief Justice Rehnquist,
thought that a rational basis test applied to this equal protection challenge on the theory that immigration policy is subject to the plenary
power of Congress. 67 But even if a heightened form of scrutiny applied, Stevens believed that Congress's concern over fostering a good
relationship between father and child while the child is a minor,
68
among other reasons, satisfied this more stringent test.
65. A more recent variant on this issue is the question of whether the temporaxy
sojourn abroad of a legal permanent resident interrupts her immigration status, thereby

treating her reentry into the United States as a first time entry rather than as a return.
See, e.g., AixmKo Er At., supra note 25, at 425-29 (describing court split on issue). Compare In re Collado-Munoz, L & N. Dec. 3333 (1998) (interim decision)

(stating that statutory provisions limit applicability of Fleuti doctrine exempting returning resident from being treated as first-time entrant) with Richardson v. Reno, 994
F. Supp. 1466 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (holding that Fleuti doctrine as to whether noncitizen's
departure was a "brief, casual and innocent departure" may be considered because of
ambiguity in statute). See also Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
66. 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
67. lId at 434 n.1 1. While the "rational basis" standard suggests a more stringent
review than the complete deference to Congress reflected in Chae Chan Ping, both
within and without immigration law, such review has rarely led to the invalidation of
Congressional action. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 503 U.S. 307,
313-14 (1993) (applying rational basis test and noting "[w]here there are 'plausible
reasons' for Congress' action, 'our inquiry is at an end"') (citation omitted).
68. Miller, 523 U.S. at 440.
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Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, asserted that the Court
had no power to provide the relief Miller requested. To the extent that
Miller sought citizenship as her remedy, Scalia asserted that only Congress could confer this upon her, even if the Court were to agree with
69
her equal protection claim.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, seemed to suggest
that the viability of the gender-based equal protection claim was governed by who brought the suit. Because Miller was a noncitizen, the
challenged statute, as applied to her, would be upheld under the most
deferential "rational basis" standard of review. O'Connor therefore
concluded that Stevens's analysis of the statute was correct. 70 However, in an interesting piece of dicta, O'Connor noted that had Miller's
father, who had been erroneously dismissed from the case, remained
in the suit, the heightened scrutiny befitting a gender-based claim
would have applied, and O'Connor would have voted to strike down
the INA provision. 7 '
The O'Connor opinion is particularly intriguing because its gender discrimination analysis tracks that of the dissenters in Miller, all
three of whom voted to strike down the legislation. Over the course of
two opinions, Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter agreed with the
heightened scrutiny standard mentioned in the O'Connor dicta. Unlike O'Connor, however, none of the three justices found standing to
be a relevant issue, paving the way for Miller to assert her father's
72
gender-based claim as a third party.
The Miller decision is therefore as frustrating as it is encouraging
for individual constitutional rights claims. On the positive side, a
solid five-person majority on the current Court believes that genderbased stereotypes cannot survive an equal protection challenge even
within the realm of immigration law.73 On the other hand, the thrust
of O'Connor's dicta spoke only to the rights of citizens in conferring
citizenship upon their noncitizen children born out of wedlock, rather
than directly affirming the rights of the noncitizen herself. Indeed,
69. Id. at 452-59.
70. Id. at 445-52.
71. Id. at 451-52.
72. Id. at 460-90.
73. For an illuminating discussion of Miller, see Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power: Judicialand Executive Branch
Decision Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998 Sup. CT. REv. 1. See also The Supreme
Court 1997 Term: Gender Discrimination-Immigrationand Nationality Act, 112
HARV. L. REv. 202-12 (1998).
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even the Breyer dissent noted that a deferential standard of review
applies "in [cases] involving [noncitizens]."7 4
In its latest pronouncement on immigrants' rights within immi-

gration law-the 1999 decision of Reno v. AADC 75-the Court stated
that noncitizens could not assert a First Amendment selective prosecution claim to challenge their otherwise valid deportation order. In a
case more popularly known as the "LA 8 case," 76 the INS sought to

deport eight noncitizens (two of whom were permanent residents) because of their affiliation with the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine ("PFLP"), which the U.S. government described as a terror-

ist organization.
In the convoluted lower court litigation, 77 the government contended that while the First Amendment would protect the rights of

U.S. citizens to affiliate with groups such as the PFLP, the same protection does not extend to noncitizens. As then FBI Director William

Webster admitted, "If these individuals had been United States citizens, there would not have been a basis for their arrest." 78 Several
variations of this argument were presented in the federal district and

appeals courts, but they were soundly rejected each time. The lower
courts agreed with the noncitizens that the First Amendment required

that they not be selectively targeted for deportation solely because of
79
their political affiliations.
The Justice Department pursued an appeal to the Supreme Court,
which, though initially declining to address them, resolved the First

Amendment issues in its opinion after the parties had left them unbriefed.

0

Although the case was resolved on statutory grounds, the

74. Miller, 523 U.S. at 480 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
75. 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
76. For a thorough discussion of this case and other issues involving the targeting
of so-called "terrorists" because of their political affiliations, see JAmEs X. D_%iPsEY
& DAVID CoLE, TERRoRisi & THE CONsTrmmON: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERPMES IN
THE NAIV OF NATIONAL SECURITY 33-46 (1999).
77. The full citation to the various trial and appellate court cases speaks for itself.
Reno v. AADC, 525 U.S. 471 (1999), vacating and remanding, 119 F.3d 1367 (9th
Cir. 1997); AADC v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995); AADC v. Meese, 714 F.
Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1989), afd in part, rev'd in part, AADC v. Thornburgh, 970
F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1991).
78. DEn,sm- & CoLE, supra note 76, at 35.
79. Id at 39-41.
80. l at 41-42. Indeed, Justice Souter scolded the majority for ruling on the First
Amendment issue after the Court specifically told the parties it would not do so.
AADC, 525 U.S. at 511 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("No doubt more could be said with
regard to the theory of selective prosecution in the immigration context, and I do not
assume that the Government would lose the argument. That this is so underscores the
danger of addressing an unbriefed issue that does not call for resolution even on the
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Court nonetheless opined on the selective prosecution argument, siding with the government and noting that the First Amendment typically did not prevent the INS from choosing whom to deport among
noncitizens illegally present: "[A]n alien unlawfully in this country
has no constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as a defense
against his deportation." 81 The Court reasoned that allowing such
claims would unnecessarily hamper the operations of the executive
branch as it seeks to merely enforce the immigration rules set by
Congress:
Even when deportation is sought because of some act the alien has
committed, in principle the alien is not being punished for that act
(criminal charges may be available for that separate purpose) but is
merely being held to the terms under which he was admitted. And
in all cases, deportation is necessary in order to bring to an end an
ongoing violation of United States law. The contention that a violation must be allowed to continue because it has been improperly
82
selected is not powerfully appealing.
Without specifying a concrete example, the Court did note, however,
that there may be rare cases in which the alleged basis of discrimination is so outrageous that the balance may be tipped in the noncitizen's
83
favor.
While not specifically mentioned, the plenary power doctrine underlies the Court's argument here as well. Congress has the power to
determine the terms and conditions of a noncitizen's presence in the
United States and has vested in the Attorney General the power to
enforce such provisions; therefore, it is not for the Court to secondguess the other branches' actions in the typical deportation case except
when their conduct is constitutionally outrageous.
Court's own logic."). Not surprisingly, Souter characterizes this part of the opinion as
dicta, which technically it is. Id. at 510. However, dicta can often be turned into a
holding upon application by a lower court. See, e.g., Romero, Guiterrez, supra note
t, at 66 (describing Guitterez court's reliance on dicta from Supreme Court's Verdugo
opinion to initially rule that undocumented immigrants are not entitled to Fourth
Amendment protections); see also Justice Ginsburg's partial concurrence, which Justice Breyer joined: "We thus lack full briefing on respondents' selective enforcement
plea and on the viability of such objections generally. I would therefore leave the
question an open one." AADC, 525 U.S. at 497 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part).
81. AADC, 525 U.S. at 488.
82. Id. at 491 (emphasis in original).
83. Id. At least one clear example comes to mind: under the Fifth Amendment, the
Court would probably not tolerate the INS's physically torturing only Mexican citizens in order to coerce them to confess their undocumented status to facilitate deportation efforts. Indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment analogue to Fifth Amendment due
process includes the parallel right to be free from beatings by government agents who
seek to coerce confessions. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936).
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Just as in Landon and Miller, Reno v. AADC has both a positive

and negative message for noncitizen constitutional claimants in the

immigation context. The good news is that the Court has left open
the possibility that the government is precluded from engaging in discriminatory conduct so egregious as to rise to the level of a constitutional offense. The bad news is that the Court views such a possibility

as arising in the "rare case," 84 and that the Court should otherwise
defer to the political branches' expertise in immigration matters, even

if an analogous prosecution of citizens based on their group affiliations would raise a valid constitutional claim.
Further, the Court's deference to a congressional and executive

bent on combating "terrorism" is reminiscent of the prejudice against
the Chinese underlying Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting, or the
"red scare" that likely influenced the Knauff, Harisiades, and Mezei

decisions. While race relations have improved in the years since Chae
Chan Ping, and the end of the Cold War will likely preclude a reprise

of Knauff, these precedents are still cited to justify the denial of noncitizens' constitutional claims in the name of Congressional plenary
power over immigration.
Unless the Court decides to seriously undermine Congress's ple-

nary power over immigration by subjecting the INA to heightened
scrutiny, as intimated in Miller,85 meritorious noncitizen constitutional
claims will continue to be the "rare case" as far as the Supreme Court

is concerned. This will be true even where, as in Reno v.AADC, the
noncitizens present colorable arguments that would be winning ones

for U.S. nationals. 86 As mentioned earlier, and as Motomura contends, courts are willing to protect noncitizen substantive rights claims
84. AADC, 525 U.S. at 491.
85. As Steve Legomsky has noted, the Court in the modem era has applied a rational basis standard of judicial review that appears to be more stringent than deferring to Congress's plenary power, but has actually become a largely deferential
standard in practice. See Legomsky, Ten More Years, supra note 18, at 930. Except
in the Commerce Clause area, see supra note 22, and in a few notable cases, the
modem Court has typically deferred to Congress under rational basis scrutiny as long
as there might be any "plausible reason" for the challenged legislation. See, e.g., FCC
v.Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) ("Where there are 'plausible reasons' for Congress'[s] action, 'our inquiry is at an end."') (citation omitted).
See also, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (applying rational basis test to
strike anti-gay state constitutional amendment); City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (invalidating city zoning ordinance under rational basis

test).
86. For more on the First Amendment rights of noncitizens following Reno v.
AADC, see, e.g., Maryam Kamali Miyamoto, The First Amendment After Reno %%
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee: A Different Bill of Rights for
Aliens?, 35 HARv. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 183 (2000).
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through favorable statutory interpretation. 87 Ironically, along with its
pro-government position on the First Amendment argument, the Reno
v. AADC Court found that Congress's statutory amendment to the INA
stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear the substance of the
noncitizens' claims, thereby precluding a discussion of the substantive
88
claim via the closing of a procedural door.
While the author believes that efforts to dismantle the plenary
power doctrine should continue to be pursued,89 this article asserts that
the adage "if you can't beat 'em, join 'em," might prove a useful
motto for a more fruitful strategy. Given the proven resilience of the
plenary power doctrine from Chae Chan Ping to Reno v. AADC, together with the coming shift in demographics making the Latino and
Asian groups the majority "minorities," the plenary power doctrine
could be used to effect positive immigration reform through politics
rather than the courts. The following Part will explore the pros and
cons of a strategy that entails recent immigrant groups using their projected majority group member status to enact legislative and executive
enforcement changes that are more protective of immigrants' rights,
knowing that, if challenged, the courts will likely uphold the new immigration policy under the plenary power doctrine.
II
THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION:

PROMISES AND PrrIFAL.S

A.

The Promise Behind a Pro-ImmigrantPoliticalStrategy

Despite a few recent hints that the Supreme Court might entertain
constitutional challenges to immigration laws, Congress's plenary
power and the executive branch's delegated authority to enforce these
laws remain formidable barriers to advocates of greater protection for
noncitizen rights. This section suggests an alternative to the judicial
route: New citizens of Latino and Asian background should join
forces in anticipation of their ascendancy to demographic majority
group member status in the coming years and effect pro-immigration
87. See supra note 58.

88. See AADC, 525 U.S. at 476-87. For more on this issue, see, for example,

Hiroshi Motomura, JudicialReview in Immigration Cases After AADC: Lessonsfrom
Civil Procedure, 14 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 385 (2000); Leti Volpp, Court-Stripping and
Class-Wide Relief: A Response to JudicialReview in Immigration Cases After AADC,
14 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 463 (2000) (responding to Prof. Motomura); see also LECOM.
SKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY, supra note 27, at 155-70;

89. Indeed, some of this author's prior work is dedicated to that end. See, e.g.,

Romero, Congruence, supra note 15; Romero, Hostage, supra note
Guiterrez, supra note t.

t; Romero,
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legislation. Specifically, this section will discuss why Latino- and
Asian-Americans have a vested interest in ensuring individual rights
protections in the field of immigration law. In so doing, it will examine the intersection of race and alienage in America by identifying
the problem, proposing a political solution, applying the solution to
two important immigration issues, and describing the advantages of
pursuing a political solution over seeking a judicial remedy.
As Kevin Johnson has shown, citizens of color should take note
of the anti-immigrant policies currently in place because many of
them have a disproportionate impact on racial minorities. 90 With forecasted changes in demography, however, Latino- and Asian-Americans will be poised to correct these wrongs, provided that they
mobilize politically and coalesce around the goal of restoring human
dignity to U.S. immigration policy.
1.

The ProblematicIntersection of Race and Alienage: Current
Attacks on Citizens and Noncitizens of Color

Despite the anti-Chinese and anti-Communist rhetoric that undergirded the development of the plenary power doctrine, an advantage of
having the Court defer to Congress on immigration policy was that as
Congress's policy became less discriminatory against certain groups,
such legislation could not effectively be challenged in court. Hence,
the large number of Americans of Latino and Asian descent is due
primarily to the lifting of the National Origins Quota system that had
largely barred immigration from Asia and Latin America prior to
1965. 9 1 Coincidentally, in the 1960s Congress was also involved in
enacting historic legislation designed to alleviate domestic discrimination against people of color. Both the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 paved the way for the realization of
many substantive gains in the area of equal rights for minority citizens. 92 Congress's largesse with respect to both citizens and noncitizens of color was tacitly supported by a Supreme Court willing to
90. Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the InmzigrationLaws, and Domestic Race Relations:
A "Magic Mirror" into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111 (1998) [hereinafter
Johnson, Magic Mirror].

91. For a comprehensive review of the 1965 Act, see Chin, supra note 36.
92. Interestingly, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was upheld against consitutional
challenge as having been properly enacted under the Commerce Clause, as opposed to
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). Since 1995, however, the viability of future civil rights
laws being passed under Congress's plenary commerce power has been cast into
doubt by the Court's decision in Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking
Gun-Free School Zones Act as exceeding Congress's commerce power). See also
recent federalism cases, supra note 22.
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defer to the duly-elected representatives of the people, just as the
Court supported the more restrictive and discriminatory laws of an
earlier time.
History reveals an ebb and flow in individual rights' protections,
Scholars describe the current backlash against both citizens and noncitizens of color today as being the mirror image of the expansive gains
of the 1960s and early 1970s. 93 The nation's growing intolerance for
protecting the rights of citizens of color is demonstrated by the current

assault on affirmative action programs nationwide, and their successful eradication in large immigrant-rich states such as California 94 and
Texas, 95 despite the recent release of a comprehensive study prepared
by two leading academics on the policy's societal benefits. 96 In addi-

tion, the all-too-common law enforcement ploy of pre-textually stopping minority drivers-so-called "Driving While Black" 97 or
"Driving While Mexican" 98-is another example of the perpetuation
of second-class citizenship for people of color even in the post-Brown
93. Johnson, supra note 90, at 1111.
94. See, e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition 209, 47 DUKE L.J. 187 (1997); Eugene Volokh, The CaliforniaCivil Rights Initiative:An Interpretive Guide, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1335 (1997); Symposium on Race and the Law, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics
& PUB. POL'Y 1 (1997); Winkfield F. Twyman, Jr., A Critique of the California Civil
Rights Initiative, 14 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 181 (1997); L. Damell Weeden, Affirmative
Action California Style-Proposition 209: The Right Message While Avoiding a Fatal ConstitutionalAttraction Because of Race and Sex, 21 S.ArrLE U. L. REV. 281
(1997). See also Legomsky, Ten More Years, supra note 18.
95. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, Texas v.
Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996). After backing more attacks against affirmative action in Washington state and at the University of Michigan, the Center for Individual
Rights has set its sights on Florida, where Governor Jeb Bush's relationship to President George W. Bush might catapult the issue into the national spotlight. Janet Marshall, GovernorDefends Stance on Plan, HERALD-TRIBUNE (Sarasota), Feb. 21, 2000,
at lB.
96. See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONo-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS
(1998) (arguing for continuation of affirmative action policies). But see STEPHlAN
THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WITE: ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE 412-22 (1997) (discussing challenges to affirmative action in higher

education and arguing for its eradication).
97. See, e.g., David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1999); Jennifer A. Larrabee, "DWB
(Driving While Black)" and Equal Protection: The Realities of an Unconstitutional
Police Practice, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 291 (1997); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333 (1998); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the
Usual Suspects: Race and the FourthAmendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 956 (1999).
98. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration
Enforcement, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 675 (2000); see also Jim Yardley, Some Texans Say
Border Patrol Singles Out Too Many Blameless Hispanics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26,
2000, at A17 ("'Why were you stopped?' asks the local joke. The answer: 'Driving
while Mexican."').
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v. Board of Education9 9 era of dejure equality. Indeed, for some, the
school segregation of the Brown era is too far removed from today's

society to have any legal significance,

00

yet an increasing number of

public schools in progressive northeastern states such as Connecticut

continue to become more and more segregated, 01 highlighting the reality that°2de facto equality does not necessarily follow de jure

equality.1

This anti-minority bias is also reflected in this country's current
anti-immigrant mood. While some corrections have been made to the

welfare laws,103 and quotas for skilled foreign workers have in-

creased,' °4 the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the two largest anti-

immigrant laws of 1996-the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA")

05

and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Im-

99. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
100. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 506 (1992) (Scalia. J., concurring) ("At
some time, we must acknowledge that it has become absurd to assume, without any
further proof, that violations of the Constitution dating from the days when Lyndon
Johnson was President, or earlier, continue to have an appreciable effect upon the
current operation of schools.").
101. See Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996) (ruling that resegregation of
Connecticut public schools violated state equal protection guarantees); Bradley W.
Joondeph, Review Essay, A Second Redemption?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 169, 170
(1999) (noting that court relinquishment of jurisdiction over desegregation has led to
"substantial degree of resegregation").
102. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) (arguing that
courts should seek to remedy de facto as well as de jure discrimination based on
"unconscious racism" historically inherent in American legal system).
103. See generally Charles Wheeler, The New Alien Restrictionson PublicBenefits:
The Full Impact Remains Uncertain, 73 INERPrEaR RELEASEs 1245 (1996) (explaining that 1996 welfare "reform" act contained several provisions that denied spzcific benefits to certain lawful permanent residents, among others); see also Michael
Scaperlanda, Who Is Ay Neighbor?: An Essay on Immigrants, Welfare Reform, and
the Constitution, 29 CoNN. L. REv. 1587 (1997). During the end of his second term,
President Clinton was moving towards restoring many of the benefits to noncitizens
abrogated by the welfare "reform" bill. Unfortunately, rather than being a total restoration of benefits to all legal permanent residents, the reform measures simply grandfather certain claims made by limited categories of immigrants, leaving most without
recourse. See Michael Janofsky, Legal Immigrants IVould Regain Aid in President's
Plan, N.Y. Tims, Jan. 25, 1999, at Al.
104. While the 1998 fiscal year cap on the popular H-1B visas for skilled workers
was 65,000, compromise legislation raised this limit to 115,000 in fiscal years 1999
and 2000, receding slighfly to 107,500 for fiscal year 2001. STENt H. Ira-comsiy,
INMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND Poucy 16 (2d ed. Supp. 1999). After 2001,
however, the ceiling reverts to 65,000 permanently. Id. Parallel Senate and House
bills now pending would raise the limit to 200,000 for fiscal years 2001-2003. See
Rep. Smith's H-1B Proposal Wins JudiciaryApproval; Battle of the Bills Imminent,
77 INTERPRETER RELEA S 657, 658 (2000).
105. Pub. L. 104-132, § 423, 110 Stat. 1214, 1272 (1996) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) (1994)) limiting judicial review).
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migrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRAIRA") 106 -still remain in
force, and most polls reveal that around two-thirds of the populace
would favor restrictions on immigration despite their belief that family
07
members should be entitled to bring in their relatives.
Johnson asserts that citizens of color should care about these attacks on immigrants because of the parallels between the nation's current anti-minority and anti-immigrant stance.10 Specifically, he
posits that policy-makers would restrict the rights of minority citizens
even more if they could, but they are constrained by the Constitution.
In contrast, the federal government is freer to discriminate against
9
noncitizens because of Congress's plenary power over immigration. 10
The attacks on affirmative action and the prominence of racial
profiling in traffic stops clearly illustrate Johnson's argument. In both
cases, the dominant white culture has, consciously or unconsciously,
sought to suppress the rights of people of color, many of whom are
immigrants. California and Texas, two states with large, but still minority, Latino populations, have both witnessed the demise of affirmative action, which was challenged for the preferences it accorded
people of color-predominantly African- and Latino-American-in
education and employment contexts. Ron Unz, a California politician,
suggests that the white majority's decision is the act of a group that
already believes itself to be a minority. To attack affirmative action
implicitly anticipates the whites' inevitable fall from their majority
status, so they seek protection of their soon-to-be minority interests
through the initiative process at a point when they still command a

majority. 110

In the pre-textual traffic stop context, the term "Driving While
Mexican" describes the efforts of the border patrol to combat undocumented immigration by often stopping motorists for no other reason
than that they look "foreign" or "Mexican." ' I While simply looking
Hispanic is insufficient as a basis for the INS's inferring undocumented status, the Supreme Court held in 1975 that it was a factor that
could be considered by those patrolling the U.S.-Mexico border." 2
106. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (1994).
107. New America, Same Old Politics: The United States Survey, ECONOMIST, Mar.
11, 2000, at 5 [hereinafter New America].
108. Johnson, Magic Mirror, supra note 90, at 1116.
109. Id.
110. New America, supra note 107, at 17.
111. See supra note 98.

112. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). But see United
States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that person's
"Latino" appearance should not be relevant factor in border patrol automobile stops).
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Just as in affirmative action, Latino appearance and background intersect with perceived foreignness to elicit nativistic reactions from the
dominant culture intent on maintaining political power. Thus, in both
the affirmative action and the "Driving While Mexican" context, race
and alienage intersect sharply, making both citizens and noncitizens of
color easy targets for discriminatory policy.
The solution? Latino- and Asian-Americans should begin to flex
and develop their political muscle to stem the tide of anti-minority and
anti-immigrant sentiment by returning the recognition of human rights
to its rightful place within immigration law and policy. Given the
U.S. Supreme Court's reluctance to protect noncitizens' rights by deferring to the political branches' plenary power, such reform may be
best accomplished through political action, not through court review.
2. A PoliticalSolution: Latino- and Asian-American Leadership in
Immigration Refornn-ProjectedDemographic Shifts,
Unique Perspectives, Golden Opportunities
The predicted demographic diminution of white majority power
from 1950 to 2050 is dramatic:
In the 1950 census, America was 89% white and 10% black. Other
races hardly got a look-in. Now Latinos account for around 12% of
the population. Within the next five years, they will overtake
blacks to become the largest minority group. If current trends
continue, they will be the majority in Los Angeles County in ten
years. In 20 years, they will dominate Texas and California. By
2050, one in four of the 400 [million] people who will then be
living in the United States will be Latino-and if you add in
13
Asians, their joint share will be one in three.'
Meanwhile, in 2050 whites will comprise approximately fifty-three

percent, a decline from seventy-two percent in

1999.114

That Latinos

will become the majority in Los Angeles County suggests that if immigration rates remain high for both Latinos and Asians t 5s and if
birthrates for U.S. citizen children of these new immigrants also hold
steady, America will be predominantly nonwhite some time in the not113. Oh, Say, Can You See?, in The New Americans, TnE Eco..\omsr, Mar.

11,

2000, at 3 [hereinafter 01 Say, Can you See?].

114. Randolph E. Schmid, America's Changing: Census Sees Older,More Diverse
U.S. Ahead, ABCNews.Com, at http:llwww.abcnews.go.comlsectionslusDailyNews/
censusOO0113.html (Jan. 13, 2000).
115. See Dorian Friedman & Kenan Pollack, Ahead: A Vety Different Nation, U.S.
NEws & WoRU, REP., Mar. 25, 1996, at 16 ("Hispanics and Asians will grow fastest,
on average, because of high immigration rates .... ."); Oh, Saiv Can You See?, supra
note 113, at 3 ("The rise of these new Americans is being fueled by immigration.").
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too-distant future. At the point when Latinos and Asians achieve majority status, they will be able to effectively change immigration policy through political action if they so choose.
To the extent that many Latinos and Asians will become U.S.
nationals through immigration and naturalization, many of these new
citizens would have both a unique perspective and a golden opportunity to restore human rights protections currently missing from American immigration law. As descendants of those Asians who suffered
under ancient exclusionary laws, such as those upheld in Chae Chan
Ping, 1 6 and of those Latinos who were repatriated to Mexico during
the New Deal,11 7 these new majority group members will be able to
clearly comprehend the injustice wrought by unfair and discriminatory
immigration policies. Indeed, they will not have to look too far into
the past to recognize that injustices continue against immigrants, many
of whom are Asian and Latino. Proposition 187, which in 1994 was
passed by a California electorate bent on depriving certain public benefits to undocumented immigrants," 8 was spurred by strong nativistic,
anti-Mexican rhetoric."19 Because of this unique perspective, many
Latino- and Asian-Americans will be well-positioned to assert leadership roles in changing American immigration policy to restore human
rights to an immigration code that often in application curtails certain
privileges generally available to U.S. citizens.
3.

The PoliticalSolution Applied: Chae Chan Ping and Knauff
Revisited - Eliminating Diversity Visas and Restoring
JudicialReview

Two areas for potential immigration reform bear special mention,
because they are regarded by some as modem incarnations of past
anti-immigration policies that were upheld by the Supreme Court in
Chae Chan Ping and Knauff. The first set of reforms involves eliminating the diversity visa lottery, which allocates immigrant visas for
noncitizens from designated "low admission" nations only, and which
116. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
117. Johnson, Magic Mirror,supra note 90, at 1136 (describing repatriation of Mexican-Americans alongside Mexicans).
118. See Romero, Congruence, supra note 15, at 448-49, 455.

119. For an example of such rhetoric, see Richard K. Yamauchi, Letter to the Editor,
Illegal Students Given PreferentialCoverage, L.A. TIMES (Valley Ed.), Oct. 30, 1994,

at B16, availableat 1994 WL 2360440 ("[T]he state of California is not a province of
Mexico. The victory of Proposition 187 will be proof that the state of California
belongs to the United States of America."). Proposition 187 was effectively defeated
in federal court. See Patrick J. McDonnell, Davis Won't Appeal Prop. 187 Ruling,

Ending Court Battles, L.A. TIMEs, July 29, 1999, at Al.
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is analogous, at one level, to the barriers to entry erected by the Chinese Exclusion Laws upheld in Chae Chan Ping. The second group
of policy changes advocates restoring judicial review of some discriminatory deportation decisions, which hearkens back to the procedural
due process protections sought in Knatff.
First, let us examine the issue of "geographic priorities"' 2 0 -immigration preferences to certain noncitizens based solely on their national origin rather than their personal qualifications. In the late
1880s, the Supreme Court upheld Congressional policies that forbade
only Chinese citizens from entering the United States.12 1 While those
restrictions gave way to less discriminatory policies culminating in the
abolition of the National Origins Quota system in 1965,1 2 similar geographic priorities still exist in immigration law.
Specifically, the Immigration Act of 199012 allotted 55,000
visas per year to be distributed via lottery to would-be immigrants
from certain "low admission states."' 24 Since its debut in 1994, most
of the visas have gone to Europeans and Africans,125 while, in recent
years, "high admission state" citizens from countries like Canada, the
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, India, Jamaica, Mexico, the People's Republic of China, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, the
United Kingdom, and Vietnam have been precluded from participating
in the lottery.1 26 One could argue that precluding the Chinese from
participating in the diversity lottery is but a modem version of the
Chinese Exclusion Laws. Just as the Chinese were not allowed to
immigrate to the U.S. during the late 1800s, today, the Chinese have
been effectively barred from applying for diversity visas because of
their "high admission" rate status.
In response, those who favor the diversity lottery argue that aside
from fostering cultural unity, geographic priorities provide a valid
counterweight against heavy Asian and Latino immigration post-1965,
120. Stephen H. Legomsky, Inunigration, Equalit, and Diversity, 31 COLUM. J.
L. 319, 323 (1993) [hereinafter Legomsky, Immigration,Equality] ("By

TRANSNAT'L

geographic priorities, I mean those that are assigned on the basis of the country or
region from which the person is immigrating, rather than on the basis of personal
attributes.").
121. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); see also supra

notes
122.
123.
124.
125.
206.

28-30 and accompanying text.
See Chin, supra note 36.
Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).
Legomsky, Imigration,Equality,, supra note 120, at 320.
LEGOmSKY, INSMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND Potcy, supra note t, at

126. Kunal M. Parker, Official Imaginations: Globalization, Difference, and State-

Sponsored hmnigrationDiscourses, 76 OR. L. REv. 691, 713 (1997).
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thereby correcting what some might contend is defacto discrimination
against some Europeans and Africans. 127 However, the elimination of
the National Origins Quota system in 1965 is categorically different
from the current diversity lottery scheme because the former was
meant to bar certain immigrants based on their country of origin; thus,
the 1965 abolition was intended to correct then existing immigration
inequities between countries, not to deny entry to Europeans. 12 8 In
contrast, it is difficult to argue that the diversity visa program serves
the same purpose when it does little more than perpetuate the racial
status quo by adding to the already majority race of white people in

this country.
Thus, the elimination of the diversity visa program would be a
strong issue around which both Asian- and Latino-Americans could
unite. As noted above, Asians and Latinos appear to comprise the
majority of people ineligible for the visa lottery and would therefore
object to their exclusion. In addition, the groups could unite with Canadian-Americans and other Caucasians precluded from the lottery.
A second fertile ground for immigration policy reform involves
the restoration of judicial review. As discussed earlier, the 1950s saw
the Supreme Court uphold the denial of hearings to noncitizens seeking to rebut charges of their inadmissibility, the historical context of
127. Legomsky, Immigration, Equality, supra note 120, at 332:
Probably the most frequent argument is that our current immigration
laws, while facially neutral, actually discriminate against Europeans;
thus, the argument runs, a diversity program is a necessary offset. The
thesis is that United States immigration laws assign the highest priority to
family unity, thus conferring a disproportionate benefit on the nationals
of those countries that have sent the most immigrants to the United States
in recent years. Those individuals are the ones most likely to have family
members in the United States.
Id. (emphasis in original). In supporting the diversity visa program, Massachusetts
Congressman Brian Donnelly argued that "our Nation must reintroduce into the immigrant stream... the peoples who have traditionally made up our immigrant stock."
Legal Immigration Legislation: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Immigration,Refu.
gees, and InternationalLaw of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 7
(1988) (testimony of Rep. Brian Donnelly); see also Patricia I. Folan Sebben, Note,
U.S. Immigration Law, Irish Immigration and Diversity: Chad Mile Fdilte (A Thousand Times Welcome)?, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 745 (1992) (arguing fairness of allocation of most diversity visas to Irish).
128. Legomsky, Immigration, Equality, supra note 120, at 333-34.
The answer, of course, is that the 1965 reforms hardly discriminated
against Europeans. Europeans were "adversely affected" only in the
sense that Congress was repealing a law that had affirmatively discriminated in their favor. One could as easily argue that our laws should accord special privileges to southern whites because their ancestors were
"adversely affected" by the abolition of slavery.
Id. (citation omitted).
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which involved the burgeoning Cold War.' 29 The 1996 legislative
curtailment of judicial review under both the AEDPA 130 and

IIRAIRA 131 are reminiscent of these earlier denials of due process
without the anti-Communist undercurrent.
As recent scholarship demonstrates, the reasons provided for
these 1996 laws are no more persuasive than those offered to justify
the 1950s decisions. While the primary justification for limiting judi-

cial review in IIRAIRA was to expedite the deportation process, Lenni
Benson has persuasively argued that, "[a]s an empirical matter, judi-

cial review of immigration proceedings is not the major, or even a
significant, cause of delay in the removal of noncitizens."'

32

In addi-

tion, curtailing judicial review to achieve efficiency often comes at the
expense of the noncitizen's individual rights. For instance, in
Ramnallo v. Reno,133 the INS promised the noncitizen criminal defen-

dant that it would not initiate removal proceedings if he cooperated
with the U.S. Attorney's Office. The INS then reneged and began to
deport the noncitizen. While the trial court ruled that the INS could

not breach its own promise not to deport the cooperating noncitizen,
the D.C. Circuit overturned this decision, holding that the then-recently enacted IRAIRA13 stripped the federal courts of their jurisdiction over removal proceedings initiated by the Attorney General.' 3 5
129. See Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); United States ex rel. Knauffv.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); see also supra Part I.
130. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, § 423,
110 Stat. 1272 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(B) (1994)) (limiting judicial
review).
131. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8
U.S.C. § 1252 (1994).
132. Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial
Review of hmnigrationProceedings,29 CoNN. L. RPav. 1411, 1442-43 n.159 (1997);
see also Lenni B. Benson, The New World of JudicialReview of Removal Orders, 12
GEo. IMIG. L.. 233 (1998); Stephen H. Legomsky, Political Asylum and the Theory of JudicialReview, 73 Mnq. L. REv. 1205 (1989) (discussing costs and benefits
of judicial review); Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Erecuthiv Detention, and the
Removal of Aliens, 98 COLIM. L. REv. 961 (1998).

133. 931 F. Supp. 884, 886 (D.D.C. 1996).
134. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8
U.S.C. § 1252(g) (1994).
135. For more on "promise enforcement" cases, see Romero, Expanding, supra note
15. In January of this year, the Supreme Court decided to review two key provisions
of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 regarding the statute's limits on judicial review and its retroactivity in Calcano-Martinez .
INS and INS v. St. Cyr, respectively. See Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 232 F.3d 328 (2d
Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 849 (Jan. 12, 2001) (No. 00-1011); INS v. St.
Cyr, 229 F.3d 406 (2d Cir. 2000), cert.granted, 121 S. Ct. 848 (Jan. 12, 2001) (No.
00-767).
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Because Latinos and Asians comprise the largest immigrant
groups, it is reasonable to assume that they are well-represented
among those subject to removal, and are therefore likely to be disproportionately disadvantaged by the lack of judicial review.' 36 While
perhaps not as politically palatable as the diversity lottery issue, the
restoration of judicial review in certain contexts provides the only arguably fair result, as the promise enforcement case of Ramallo illustrates.' 37 As mentioned in the prior context, coalition-building is
important, and Latino- and Asian-Americans interested in restoring judicial review to certain immigration decisions would find support in
the efforts of the non-partisan American Bar Association, which had
the item on its list of lobbying priorities for the year 2000.138
136. In the three databases of expedited removal cases used by the Center for Human
Rights and International Justice, Asian and Latin American countries were well-represented. For example, Cuba and Mexico appeared among the top ten in both attorney
databases for the greatest number of cases, while Sri Lanka topped the attorney
databases and was ninth in the EOIR database. CTR. FOR HUMAN RioHTs & INT'L
JUSTICE, THE EXPEDITED REMOVAL STUDY: REPORT ON THE SECOND YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION OF EXPEDITED REMOVAL, Tables 1-3, 129-30 (1999), available at http://
www.uchastings.edu/ers/reports/1999.
137. The author realizes, of course, that some may not share his view that citizens of
any stripe should show empathy toward criminal noncitizens like Ramallo. See, e.g.,
Anthony Lewis, 'Accent the Positive', N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1997, at A23 (discussing
Senator Spencer Abraham's view that to make case for legal immigration, one must
also "make clear that you're going to address the negatives, especially criminal
[noncitizens]. There is a public feeling against those who come here and commit
crimes"). However, in the "promise enforcement" context, the wrongdoing is committed by the government, not the noncitizen. As the author has previously noted,
"[ilt is the government that reneges on its promises in these cases, benefits from the
noncitizen's performance, and then acts to deport the noncitizen simply because it can
do so under the law." Romero, Expanding, supra note 15, at 46 n.254.
138. The ABA maintains the following policy on immigration:
The ABA supports legal immigration based on family reunification and
employment skills, due process safeguards in immigration and asylum
adjudications, and judicial review of such decisions. The ABA also supports restoring benefits to legal immigrants. The ABA opposes denying
public education and social services to children on the basis of their own
or their parents' immigration status and laws that require employers and
providers of education, health care, or other social services to verify citizenship or immigration status.
AM. BAR ASS'N, 2000 Legislative & Governmental Priorities:Immigration, at http://
www.abanet.org/legadv/priorities/immig.html (last updated Dec. 31, 2000). Indeed, a
visit to the ABA's website confirms that it is closely tracking Congressional action in
this area:
In the House, several bills to restore discretionary relief and improve due
process were introduced. On April 20, 1999, Reps. Barney Frank (DMA), Martin Frost (D-TX), Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-FL), and others introduced H.R. 1485, a measure that would have restored some discretionary
authority to immigration judges to halt the deportation of deserving longterm permanent residents on a case-by-case basis and provided judicial
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While there are many other areas of immigration policy reform
that might be appropriate focuses for the new majority of Latino- and
Asian-Americans, the aim of this section has been to provide but a

glimpse of the types of immigration issues that might benefit from
Latino- and Asian-American leadership given their unique perspective
on these matters and the ever-present reality of race and alienage in
39
America.'
review of such decisions. H.R. 2999, introduced on October 1, 1999, by
Rep. Bill McCollum (R-FL), also would have restored some relief from
deportation. On July 25, 2000, Rep. John Conyers (D-MI) introduced
H.R. 4966, a comprehensive bill to correct many of the problems caused
by the 1996 laws. Reps. McCollum, Frank, and others introduced H.R.
5062 to address the retroactivity of some of the 1996 deportation
provisions.
In the Senate, Sens. Edward Kennedy (D-MA), Bob Graham (D-FL) and
others introduced S. 3120 on September 27, 2000, to correct fundamental
due process problems caused by the 1996 laws. Sen. Patrick Moynihan
(D-NY) introduced S. 173 on January 19, 1999, to restore judicial review
and discretionary deportation relief and to eliminate mandatory detention.
Sens. Patrick Leahy D-VT), Sam Brownback (R-KS), Jim Jeffords RVT), and others introduced S. 1940 on November 17, 1999. The legislation would have limited expedited removal to emergency migration situations and make procedural reforms to protect asylum seekers.
Several bills to restore access to public benefits also were introduced. On
April 14, 1999, Sen. Moynihan and Rep. Sander Levin (D-141) introduced
companion bills, S. 792 and H.R. 1399. Both bills would have restored
health and nutritional benefits to certain legal immigrant pregnant
women, children, and blind or disabled medically needy individuals who
were denied coverage under the 1996 federal welfare reform law.
Id. Concern over the ill-effects of the 1996 laws described above have prompted
Representative John Conyers of Michigan to introduce immigration reform bill H.R.
4966 on July 25, 2000, which, according to the American Civil Liberties Union, has
the following attributes:
The Conyers measure would enhance judicial review of immigration decisions on such matters as deportation, asylum eligibility and detention. It
would restore the pre-1996 law granting immigration officials authority
to release immigrants who do not pose a danger to society and who are
likely to appear for future proceedings. The bill would also prevent indefinite detention of non-citizens whom the Immigration and Naturalization
Service is unable to remove. Currently, the government claims the authority to detain non-citizens indefinitely, after they have already served
criminal sentences. Finally, the bill would help correct a number of other
problems, including retroactive and discriminatory use of immigration
laws.
ACLU, ACLU EnthusiasticallyEndorses Measureto Restore Fairnessto Immigration
Laivs (July 25, 2000), available at http:/wwv.aclu.org/news2OOOnO72500b.html.
139. Of course, the author might be completely wrong in his predictions about the
political viability of either diversity visa reform or the restoration of judicial review.
In his Immigration Law class, for instance, the author floated the idea that Article II,
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The Advantages of Pursuing a PoliticalOver a Judicial
Solution

There are at least four distinct advantages to pursuing a political
rather than judicial solution to the problems outlined above as well as
other immigration-related quandaries.
First, if Latino- and Asian-Americans become the majority of the
electorate, changes in Congressional and executive immigration policy
will largely become issues of self-help. In his article on racial jury
nullification, Paul Butler cites the fact that black juries hold the power
to nullify verdicts in specific instances without having to seek the majority's approval of such acts as the primary benefit of his race-based
scheme. 140 This article's proposal is even more attractive because it
assumes that, unlike the black jurors who are currently racial and political minorities, Latino- and Asian-American citizens will comprise
the voting majority and will therefore be able to effect widespread
reform in immigration policy rather than more limited change through
individual jury verdicts. To the extent that Latino- and Asian-Americans can muster the support of other groups-Canadian-Americans
whose relatives are barred from the diversity lottery, for instancetheir power will be further consolidated.
Second, restoring humanity to immigration law will simultaneously restore confidence in an immigration system that is eyed with
suspicion by most who come in contact with it. For example, in a
recent study by Syracuse University's Government Performance Project, the INS was adjudged the least reliable among the twenty government agencies surveyed, with a rating of "C_. '' 14I Restoring judicial
review to deportation decisions and eliminating geographic priorities
in issuing immigrant visas would be concrete ways of engendering
confidence in the immigration system, prompting perhaps more immigrants to naturalize, thereby creating a cadre of productive, patriotic
U.S. citizens.
Section 1, Clause 5 of the Constitution should be amended to eliminate the requirement that the President be a natural born citizen (or a naturalized citizen at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution, an impossibility and therefore irrelevant today) because it discriminated against naturalized citizens. While the class unanimously
thought the requirement antiquated, no one expressed a strong belief that such a constitutional amendment would pass.
140. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal

Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 712 (1995) ("African-Americans should embrace
the antidemocratic nature of jury nullification because it provides them with the power
to determine justice in a way that majority rule does not.").

141. All Things Considered: Immigration and Naturalization Service Is Under
Fierce Criticismfor Poor Leadership, Accountability and Management (NPR radio

broadcast, Apr. 6, 2000), availableat 2000 WL 21470322.
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Third, positive changes in immigration law led by reform-minded
Latino- and Asian-Americans may lead to similar reforms in domestic
laws adversely affecting citizens of color. To the extent that race and
alienage intersect so closely, perhaps the concurrent liberal reforms in
immigration law and domestic civil rights laws of the 1960s and early
1970s1 42 might experience a renaissance in the 2100s when Latinoand Asian-Americans join forces with like-minded African- and European-Americans to reverse the backlash of the 1980s and 1990s.
And fourth, because the plenary power doctrine will likely persist, a political agenda of immigration reform will likewise thrive as
the federal courts maintain their deference towards Congressional and
executive action. Despite its anti-Chinese and anti-Communist
roots, 143 the plenary power doctrine's emphasis on judicial deference
to political reforms in immigration policy bodes well for Latino- and
Asian-American leaders who would seek to fortify noncitizens' rights
within the body of immigration law.
It perhaps goes without saying that the proposed political solution
is not without its disadvantages. The next section identifies possible
drawbacks of the proposed theory and seeks to address them.
B.

The Disadvantagesof a PoliticalStrategy: Possible Pitfalls

Perhaps the biggest criticism of any race-based political strategy
is that there is no guarantee that a sizeable enough number of the
group will agree to the suggested immigration reforms. Because the
terms "Latino" and "Asian" purport to include so many different ethnic groups, it is difficult to assume that these disparate subgroups will
subscribe to one platform. For many Latinos, national origin alliances, say, to the Dominican Republic or Cuba, resonate more than
the generic term Latino or Hispanic. 144 Requiring a certain level of
142. See supra notes 91-91 and accompanying texL
143. See supra Part LA.
144. Kevin R. Johnson, Inmmigration and Latino Identity, 19 CHICANo-L,%nNo L
REv. 197, 198 n.8 (1998) (citing RoDotauo 0. DE LA GARZA LT AL.., LAa'wo VoicEs:
MEXICAN, PUERTO RIcAN, AND CuBAN PERSPECnVs ON A&sucAN POLmCS 39
(1992) (reporting that Latinos are more likely to self-identify in national origin terms
- Mexican-American, say - than to use pan-ethnic designations such as Latino,
Hispanic or Spanish-American)); see also Max J. Castro, Making Pan Latino: Latino
Pan-Ethnicityand the Controversial Case of the Cubans, 2 HARv. LATrNo L REv.
179 (1997); Laura E. G6mez, Constructing Latinalo Identities, 19 CaicAo-LAnNo
L. REv. 187, 190 (1998).
At the same time, LatCrit scholars are wary of homogenizing varied ex-

periences under a single "Latino" or "Hispanic" rubric. Even as ve embrace an expansive Latino political coalition and recognize points of
shared history and contemporary experience, LatCrit scholars should seek
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pan-Latino unity is further complicated when Latinos try to join their
disparate group with yet another multiethnic group-Asians.145 Further, disputes as to who is the authentic "Asian" or "Latino" mar political unity, with membership in the pan-Latino/Asian group possibly
becoming a litmus test for authenticity. Put another way, those who
choose to disagree with the immigration reforms advocated by the coalition risk being labeled not authentically Latino or Asian. 146 Yet
another variant on this problem arises when one Asian or Latino is
asked to speak for the rest of his or her group. Frank Wu believes he
is asked to speak publicly about immigration, affirmative action, and
other topics to provide the "Asian-American perspective," and yet he
"confesses":
But I am a fraud. I am simply unqualified, because I cannot speak
for all Asian Americans. I doubt that anybody else could do any
better either, or that anybody else would wish to try that impossible
task of representing a race. I suspect, though, that at every appearance after I give my usual disclaimer, my audience continues to see
147
and hear me as a spokesperson on behalf of Asian Americans.

These four issues-assuming pan-Asian and Latino identity,
cross-cultural coalition building, authentic identities, and the race
spokesperson phenomenon-are both practical and daunting
problems. 48 However, they are not insurmountable. To the extent
to problematize pan-Latino identity. Specifically, we must continue to
engage in unpacking differences among those we label "Latinos" in the
United States.
ld; see also Kevin R. Johnson, "Melting Pot" or "Ring of Fire"?:Assimilation and
the Mexican-American Experience, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 173, 207 (1998) ("Latinos in the
United States can trace their ancestry throughout Latin America. Despite this fact,
political efforts in recent years have tended to homogenize the Latino experience.
Pan-Latino coalition building, however, often confronts national origin allegiances
that trump any collective Latino' identity.") (citation omitted).
145. See, e.g., Rachel F. Moran, What If Latinos Really Mattered in the Public Pol.
icy Debate?, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1315, 1320 (1997) ("The distinctions between Latinos
and Asian Americans are significant enough to merit careful consideration before assuming that each group has similar policy needs."). As Bernice Johnson Reagon has
written: "Coalition work is not work done in your home. Coalition work has to be
done in the streets. And it is some of the most dangerous work you can do. And you
shouldn't look for comfort." Bernice Johnson Reagon, Coalition Politics: Turning the
Century in Home Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology, in RACE AND RACES: CASES
AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 1104, 1106 (Juan F. Perea et al. eds., 2000).
146. See, e.g., Margaret (H. R.) Chon, On the Need ForAsian American Narratives
in Law: EthnicSpecimens, Native Informants, Storytelling and Silences, 3 ASIAN PAC.
AM. L.J. 4, 28-31 (1995) (noting impossibility of representing "authentic" Asian).
1
147. Frank W
u, Providing Some Perspective: On Being a ProfessionalAsian American, ASIANWEEK, Feb. 27, 1997, at 9, availableat 1997 WL 11561869.
148. For an analysis of other particular challenges for the Latino community, see
Johnson, Civil Rights, supra note 17.
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that the new majority group members will be composed mostly of new
immigrants, it is likely that these Latino- and Asian-Americans will
have had a shared immigrant experience at some level. These shared
experiences will go a long way toward helping identify specific
human rights issues that need to be addressed in immigration policy.
Taking an earlier example, many Latino- and Asian-Americans, who
as immigrants could not participate in the diversity lottery, might support an initiative to abolish such visas. After identifying the issue, the
core group need only muster the support of most Latino- or AsianAmericans, and need not have every member of those groups agree
with the proposed reform. Further, as suggested above, the core group
should also reach out to like-minded European and African-Americans
who either share the immigrant experience of the core group or agree
with the proposal. Finally, there are numerous examples of effective
coalition building, from the multiracial forces that supported the civil
rights movement of the 1960s,149 to a more recent lawsuit filed against
the University of California at Berkeley, alleging that its admissions
50
policies were discriminatory.'
Of course, there are other examples of people of color fighting
amongst themselves rather than building coalitions. Eric Yamamoto
recounts litigation involving a group of Chinese-Americans who sued
the San Francisco Unified School District challenging the constitutionality of a desegregation plan that placed a forty percent cap on
Chinese admissions while allowing admission to allegedly less qualified blacks and Latinos.15 1 But beyond group dynamics, each individ-

149. For two excellent histories of this important period, see TAYLOR BRAcn,
PA'RING THE WATERS: AmERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63 (1988) and TAYLOR
BRANCH, Pn.LAR oF FimE: ARmcA IN Tm KaG YEARS 1963-65 (1998). Indeed, the

civil rights boycotts led by Dr. Martin Luther King were not simply a multiethnic
coalition, but a multigenerational one as well. For a wonderful discussion of the role
that the younger members of that movement played, see generally DAviD HALDER.
sTAM, THE CHmDREN (1998).
150. The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund and the Asian Pacific American Legal Center of
Southern California jointly filed the suit on behalf of several minority students. See,
e.g., Evelyn Nieves, Civil Rights Groups Suing Berkeley Over Admissions Policy,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1999, at A9; Kenneth R. Weiss, UC Berkele, Sued Over Admissions Policies, L.A. Tnms, Feb. 3, 1999, at A3; see also Mireya Navarro, Bricks,
Mortarand Coalition Building, N.Y. Trmts, July 13, 2000, at Al (describing coalition-building efforts among black, Latino, and white contractors in Houston).
151. Eric K. Yamamoto, CriticalRace Praris:Race Theori andPoliticalLaw.ering
Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MicH. L. REv. 821, 822-27 (1997).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy

LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 4:343

ual can make efforts to cross racial lines and build relationships with
52
others.1
Related to this concern about the "spokesperson phenomenon" is
the problem of stereotyping. Might a Latino-/Asian-American coalition that seeks immigration reform simply perpetuate the stereotype of
the Latino and Asian as the perpetual foreigner? Neil Gotandal5 3 and
Natsu Taylor Saito1 54 describe the racial structure of America as being
one in which European- and African-Americans are presumed to be
U.S. citizens, while Latino- and Asian-Americans are not. Arguably,
just as the average audience member assumes that Frank Wu speaks
for all Asians when he talks about issues of concern to the Asian community, 155 a Latino-/Asian-American coalition advocating immigration reform might reinforce the belief that Latinos and Asians will
always be foreigners-unassimilable, disloyal, and clannish. Such
stereotypes of the perpetual foreigner pervaded the Court's justification for Congressional plenary power over immigration in Chae Chan
Ping:

If, therefore, the government of the United States, through its legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be

dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to be
152. As a Filipino with a Latino surname and an Asian appearance, the author has
found that he is able to find commonalities with both groups, leading to coalition
formations beyond his own ethnic group. See Victor C. Romero, "Aren't You Latino?": Building Bridges Upon Common Misperceptions, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 837
(2000).
153. Neil Gotanda, Asian American Rights and the "Miss Saigon Syndrome," in

AsiAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1087 (Hyung-Chan Kim ed., 1992).
[W]ithin the United States, if a person is racially identified as African
American or white, that person is presumed to be legally a U.S. citizen
and socially an American ....

[but] these presumptions are not present

for Asian Americans, Latinos, Arab Americans, and other non-Black racial minorities. Rather, there is the opposite presumption that these people are foreigners ....
Id. at 1096 (emphasis in original). See also Robert S. Chang, A Meditation on Bor-

ders, in IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN
THE UNITED STATES 244, 249 (Juan Perea ed., 1997) (concluding that Asian-Ameri-

cans are "perpetual foreigners" whose "[f]oreign-ness is inscribed upon our bodies in
such a way that Asian Americans carry a figurative border with us.").

154. Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, "Foreignness,"
and Racial Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REv. 261 (1997) (arguing that

concept of Asian-Americans as foreigners reinforces American racial hierarchy). See

also Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Hierarchy,Asian Americans and Latinos as "Foreigners," and Social Change: Is Law the Way to Go?, 76 OR. L. REv. 347 (1997) [hereinafter Johnson, Racial Hierarchy] (discussing Saito's article).

155. See supra text accompanying note 147.
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stayed because at the same time there are no actual hostilities with

1 56
the nation of which the foreigners are subjects.
Latino- and Asian-Americans seeking immigration reform will undoubtedly confront this issue, but it is a reality of life in America that

would probably persist whether or not these groups sought to reform
the nation's immigration policy. To the extent that anti-Asian senti-

ment has persisted over time from the 1880s in Chae Chan Ping, to
the wartime 1940s and Korematsu v. United States,157 to the author's
own harassment in 1996 for having married a European-American, 158

it is doubtful that such prejudice will abate in the foreseeable future.15 9
Thus, the spectre of perpetuating the perceived foreignness of Latino-

and Asian-Americans should not be enough to deter the new majority

group members from seeking effective immigration reform. Indeed,

such reform, especially if enacted with the support of "presumptive"
citizens of European and African descent, might have the salutary ef-

fect of actually breaking down the foreignness presumption by restoring the image of America as an immigrant nation for all colors.
Finally, a third major criticism of this proposal is that it may take
more time to pass legislation than to win a lawsuit and, unlike in litigation, general political reform (as opposed to private bills) will not
address the specific problems facing persons today. Despite the fact

that a large number of bills are introduced before Congress each year,
156. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (emphasis added).
157. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding Japanese internment during WWII constitutional); see also Gotanda, supra note 153, at 1098 ("The evacuated Japanese Americans, including U.S. citizens, were presumed to be sufficiently foreign for an
inference by the military that such racial-foreigners must be disloyal. Japanese Americans were therefore characterized as different from the African American racial minority. With the presence of racial foreignness, a presumption of disloyalty was
reasonable and natural."); Neil Gotanda, "Other Non-Whites" in American Legal History, 85 CoLum. L. REv. 1186, 1190-92 (1985) (reviewing PErE IRoNs, JusTICE AT
WAR (1983), and discussing Korenmatsu and other wartime "camp cases"); Eric L.
Muller, All the Themes but One, 66 U. CH. L. REv. 1395 (1999) (reviewing WiLLIAMi
H. REHNQuIST, ALL m LAWS Bur ONE (1998), and describing judges who fought to
uphold civil liberties, of, among others, Japanese internment camp victims).
158. Victor C. Romero, BroadeningOur World: Citizens and Immigrantsof Color in
America, 27 CAP. U. L. REv. 13, 30-32 (1998) (describing harassment of author and
his wife). Interestingly, the author, who is Filipino, was labeled a "Japanese sonofabitch," which hearkens back to the wartime prejudice that produced such decisions as Korematsu. Id. at 31.
159. A report by the National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium revealed
that there was a thirty-seven percent increase in suspected and proven anti-Asian incidents between 1993 and 1995. See NAT'L AsIAN PAc. AM. LEGaL CoxsoRTnM, AuDrr OF VIOLENCE AGAINST AsIAN PACIIC AMiucANs: THE Co.sEQuENcEs OF

IN'ro.wEANC IN AAmRIcA 1 (1995).
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very few bills are eventually enacted into law.160 In addition, while

private bills for relief from deportation were common during the early
years of immigration to restore humanity to the stringent application
of some laws, 6 1 the prospect of having a private immigration bill approved today is quite poor. For instance, during the first session of the
105th Congress, 35 private immigration bills were introduced, but
none were enacted; in the 104th Congress, only 2 of the 59 private
162
bills introduced passed both houses.

However, if the primary obstacle to judicial protection of immigrants' rights within the immigration code has been and continues to
be the plenary power doctrine, the earlier discussion in Part I suggests

that immigration reform advocates would be in for a much longer wait

163
should they choose only to litigate against the doctrine in court.
From Chae Chan Ping in 1883 to Reno v. AADC in 1999, the plenary
power doctrine has shown no real signs of weakening. 164 Moreover,
just as litigation strategies should be used to supplement political efforts in seeking social change, 165 a political agenda focusing on immigration reform should complement further efforts to challenge the
166
plenary power doctrine in the courts.

160. For the first session of the 105th Congress, for example, 1,568 bills were introduced in the Senate and 3,088 bills were introduced in the House of Representatives.
Of those, only 153 were enacted into law. 145 CONG. REc. D29-D31 (daily ed. Jan.
20, 1999). For more statistics on Congress, see generally NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN ET
AL., VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS 1995-1996 (1996).
161. ALEINIKOFF Er AL., supra note 25, at 787-88; see also LEGOMSKY, IMMIORATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY, supra note 104, at 41-42 (discussing use of
private bills).
162. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INS, 1997 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF

THE INS 197,
Table 74 (Oct. 1999), availableat http:lwww.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/1997YB.pdf.

163. As Peter Schuck has noted, "[c]lassical immigration law proved to be remarkably durable." Schuck, supra note 27, at 3. Compare Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principleof Plenary CongressionalPower, 1984 Sup. CT. Rnv. 255,

303-05 (predicting eventual demise of plenary power doctrine), with Legomsky, Ten
More Years, supra note 18 (lamenting resilience of plenary power doctrine).
164. See supra Part I.

165. "[Lawyers who advocate social change] ... should consider how traditional
legal action might complement and encourage-not replace-community activism
and political involvement. Put simply, an exclusive focus on litigation will not accomplish fully the desired objective." Kevin R. Johnson, Lawyering for Social
Change: What's a Lawyer to Do?, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 201, 205 (1999); see also
Johnson, Racial Hierarchy,supra note 154, at 362-67 (asking whether law is the ideal
vehicle for social change for American people of color); Johnson, Civil Rights, supra
note 17, 45-56 (questioning whether law is viable method for improving condition of
Latinos).
166. Indeed, Thurgood Marshall's litigation efforts on behalf of the NAACP were
but part of a larger civil rights movement to achieve equal rights for blacks. See
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By using a two-pronged immigration reform strategy of politics
and litigation, Latino- and Asian-Americans should have the best shot
at achieving meaningful change for those currently aggrieved by existing law (through litigation) and for future generations to come
(through political reform). While some might characterize this immigration reform platform as divisive because it pits racial groups
against each other, the thrust of the movement is not to create special
privileges for Latino- and Asian-Americans, but rather to eliminate all
vestiges of discrimination aimed, whether consciously or not, at those
of Latino and Asian descent.
The final section of this paper concludes with a return to the
Eliin Gonzdlez case to illustrate how those favoring expanding the
ability of noncitizen children to petition for asylum as individuals
should petition their Congressional leaders to change the immigration
code to allow for such an event, in addition to engaging in arguably
less effective street demonstrations and, as the Eleventh Circuit recently ruled, litigation.
CONCLUSION

ELIAN

AND "ALIENS" REVISITED

While the particular protagonists in the Elidn dispute had no
practical choice but to seek judicial intervention, the hundreds of Cuban-American supporters who engaged in protest marches and vigils
could have more constructively used their time by also working toward a long-term political strategy of reforming asylum law to expand
the rights of children to apply for refugee status on their own. 167
As discussed briefly in the introduction, Eliin's saga boiled down
to the desires of his Miami relatives to keep him in the United States
by having him seek political asylum against the wish of his father that
the boy be returned to Cuba to live with him.' 68 Because the INS
decided that Elidn had no standing to file an asylum claim over the
express wishes of his father,' 69 the Miami relatives, not surprisingly,
M

V. TusHN'r, MAKING CiviL RIGHTS LAw: THURGOOD IAo,SHALL AND "m
COURT, 1936-1961 (1994).

SuPtiRm

167. One might argue that children as young as Elin should not be allowed to apply
for asylum on their own because they could not possibly understand the process.
However, that determination could be made on a case-by-case basis, rather than presumptively precluding children because of their young age. In tort law, for example,
most jurisdictions hold children liable for their intentional or negligence torts as long
as the requisite mental state can be proven. See, e.g., DAN B. DoBs, THE LAw OF
TORTS 50 (2000) (describing child tort liability).
168. See supra notes 8-8 and accompanying text.
169. Cooper Memo, supra note 8, at 2, 10-11.
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resorted to the courts for relief, filing claims in both state 170 and federal'71 courts. Meanwhile, persons and groups sympathetic to keeping
Elidn in America mobilized politically, from members of Congress
exploring the idea of passing a private bill granting Eliin automatic
legal permanent resident status, 172 to a grassroots vigil of Cuban173
Miamians bent on defying the INS's decision to expel the child.
However, there appears to have been no unified, long-term political
strategy on the part of those supporting Eliin's asylum claim to work
toward a permanent revision of the immigration code to allow future
children greater rights to petition for asylum over their parents'
objections.
And how did the Elidn supporters fare? The Eleventh Circuit
ruled on June 1, 2000, that the INS fairly exercised its discretion in
deciding to return the child to his father. 174 The panel's reasoning
evinced an implicit endorsement of the plenary power doctrine by deferring to the agency's discretion. Because Congress had not specified
how the words "[a]ny alien... may apply for asylum"' 75 would apply
to a six-year-old child whose father did not want him to apply for
asylum, it was within the INS's power, as the agency responsible for
enforcing U.S. asylum law, to interpret this language. While the court
stated that it would not approve arbitrary INS actions or those inconsistent with the agency's own decisions, it could not substitute its
judgment for the agency's. Without specifically mentioning the plenary power doctrine but relying instead on its analogue, the Chevron
doctrine, 176 the court unequivocally demonstrated a deference to the
170. Gonzalez v. Gonzalez-Quintana, No. 00-00479 FC 29, 2000 WL 419688 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Jan. 10, 2000) (granting temporary protective order to Elidin's great-uncle),
vacated, No. 00-00479 FC 28, 2000 WL 492102 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 13, 2000) (vacating order and dismissing case because matter is federally preempted).
171. Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F. 3d 1338 (1lth Cir. 2000).
172. See DeYoung, supra note 6, at A3.
173. See, e.g., Rick Bragg, Cuban's Family Defies Reno; Court Issues a Stay, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2000, at Al.
174. Reno, 212 F.3d at 1338.
175. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (1994).
176. See Reno, 212 F.3d at 1348-49. Court deference to agency decisionmaking
stems from the Supreme Court's opinion in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), holding that reviewing courts must give
greater deference to an agency's interpretation of its own statutes. Such deference
parallels the judiciary's acceptance of the plenary power doctrine and its minimal
scrutiny of Congressional enactments. Put simply, just as the plenary power doctrine
compels the courts to defer to Congress, the Chevron doctrine requires the judiciary to
generally defer to executive agency actions. See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071 (1990). For an empirical analysis of
the impact of the Chevron doctrine in immigration cases, see Peter H. Schuck &
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political branches of government and their power over immigration
policy:
Because the statute is silent .... Congress has left a gap in the
statutory scheme. From that gap springs executive discretion. As a
matter of law, it is not for the courts, but for the executive agency
charged with enforcing the statute (here, the INS), to choose how to
fill such gaps. Moreover, the authority of the executive branch to
fill gaps is especially great in the context of immigration policy.
Our proper review of the exercise by the executive branch of its
discretion to fill gaps, therefore, must be very limited. 77
Further evidence of the court's deference comes from the panel's summary dismissal of Elian's constitutional due process claim: "Ve conclude that Plaintiff's due process claim lacks merit and does not
warrant extended discussion."1 78 It followed this single sentence with
a citation to language from Jean v. Nelson, an Eleventh Circuit precedent upheld by the Supreme Court on other grounds: "Aliens seeking
admission to the United States... have no constitutional rights with
regard to their applications .... 3,179
After the decision, lawyers for the Miami relatives sought both an
emergency stay from Justice Kennedy and a formal appeal to the Supreme Court, but to no avail.180 Given the Supreme Court's deference
to the political powers on immigration policy,' 8 ' it was highly unlikely that either the appeal or the stay would have been issued.
The short-term political strategy to keep Elin in the U.S. likewise did not bear fruit. While Congress did conduct hearings to examine Attorney General Reno's handling of the case,'8 2 Elidn returned
to Cuba with his father following the INS's decision and Congress's
reluctance to pass a private bill to override the agency's ruling. The
Theodore Hsien Wang, Continuity aid Change: Patternsof Inmzigration Litigation in
the Courts, 1979-1990, 45 STAN. L. REv. 115, 170-72 (1992).
177. Reno, 212 F.3d at 1348-49 (citations omitted).
178. I. at 1346.
179. See Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 968 (1lth Cir. 1984) (en banc), afj'd on other
grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). It should come as no surprise by now that the en banc
panel in Jean cited a long line of Supreme Court precedent-including Fong Yue
Ting, Mezei, and Landon-in support of this "plenary power" statement. Id. at 967-

68.
180. Christopher Marquis, Relatives of Boy Ask Justices to Black His Return to
Cuba, N.Y. TWas, June 27, 2000, at A14; Elidn Goes Home, N.Y. Th.tu, June 29,

2000, at A30.
181. See supra Part L
182. See Press Release, Representative Bob Barr, Barr Calls for Congressional Hearings on the Seizure of Elian Gonzalez (Apr. 24, 2000), available at 2000 WVL
7979457; David E. Rosenbaum, CongressionalRepublicans to Investigate Tahing of
Boy: Reno is Called to Appear at Capitol Today, N.Y. TimmS, Apr. 25, 2000, at A20.
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demonstrations and vigils, rather than eliciting support for their cause,
triggered a backlash, prompting the observation that some in Miami's
183
"Cuban-American community overplayed their hand."
Given the short-term litigation and political losses sustained by
the pro-Elidin-in-America forces, perhaps their best bet would be a
long-term political strategy to expand the asylum rights of children
through the political process. Now that the Eleventh Circuit has identified that the applicable statutory language "alny alien... may apply
for asylum" does not specify how it applies to children, those in the
Cuban-American community and others who believe in expanded
rights for children in this area should petition Congress to fill the gap
instead of leaving it to the discretion of the INS.18 4 Indeed, exceptions
abound in the immigration code, particularly for those groups of individuals whom Congress has decided deserve special protection. For
example, battered spouses and children of U.S. citizens are allowed to
file immigrant visa petitions independently, contrary to the usual procedure that requires the citizen to file a petition on the relative's
185
behalf.
Taking this article's prescription, a coalition of like-minded individuals led by Latino- and Asian-American advocates for immigration
reform could put forth an analogous exception that would allow children from Cuba and other Communist regimes the ability to file for
asylum over their parents' objections when there is some evidence that
the parents are under the influence of the Communist regime and,
therefore, may not be acting in the child's best interest.' 8 6 If the federal courts continue to uphold the plenary power doctrine and its ana183. William Satire, Human Interest Rules, N.Y. TiNEs, Apr. 10, 2000, at A19. Indeed, Safire described Miami-Dade mayor Penelas's defiance of federal authority as a
"foolish threat." Id.
184. The Miami-based Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center is concerned that the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in the Eliin case might have the effect of granting the INS
more discretion than Congress intended. In an amicus brief filed in the case, the
Center joined with two other human rights organizations in arguing that Congress had
never denied children the right to seek asylum, something that the INS denied Elifin in
this case. See Siobhan Morrissey, The Next Gideon? Elian Rulings Could Usher in
Free Legal Aid for Juvenile Asylum Seekers, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2000, at 26.
185. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I) (1994) (outlining battered spouse or
child exception), with 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i) (1994) (permitting U.S. citizen to
file immigrant petition for noncitizen spouse). See also CnARLES GORDON LT At., I
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.0314][D](2000) (noting battered spouse or
child exception).
186. This was one of the arguments the Miami relatives made to the INS in this case,
which the INS rejected as not substantiated by the weight of the evidence. See
Cooper Memo, supra note 8, at 6. The proposal here would allow the child to file for
asylum as long as there is some evidence of possible Communist government coercion, which there was here, through the testimony of the Miami relatives. Id. at 5.
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logue, the Chevron doctrine, such a statutory exception would likely
survive judicial scrutiny, just as the INS's policy was upheld by the
Eleventh Circuit here. As stated in the introduction,' 87 this article
takes no position on the Elign case, but hypothesizes this "child's
rights" exception to asylum law to illustrate the viability of a longterm political strategy that could be more effective than the short-term
political solutions and emergency litigation tactics, which, while understandable in Eliin's particular case, do nothing for similarly-situated children in the future.
Perhaps American society has had enough of the Elidin story that
it is unreasonable to expect even the most ardent supporters to devise
and execute a long-term political strategy for expanding children's
asylum rights. 188 This author's hope, however, is that those who believe in the importance of human rights in the immigration context
will look beyond the specifics of the Elidn saga and learn from the
Eleventh Circuit's decision and the Supreme Court's pronouncements
that, while litigation may be a necessary strategy in some instances,
the more promising avenue for true immigration reform lies in the
halls of Congress and the INS, especially if those who have the most
at stake, new citizens from Latin America and Asia, translate their
future demographic strength into focused political power at the ballot
box.
It is no small irony that the noncitizen's name in this story"Eli"-is an anagram for the term "alien"; "Eliin" refers to the
cherub-faced little boy, an individual whose asylum rights were allegedly compromised, while the term "aliens" refers to the undifferentiated mass of people who enter and leave this country and around
whom the immigration law has built a labyrinthine federal code. It is
this irony that makes the problem of immigration law such a perplexing one. How does a country regulate the flow of a large number of
noncitizens across its borders while simultaneously ensuring that each
visitor is treated with fairness? With the forecasted changes in

187. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
188. America's fleeting tolerance for any cause may be summed up by Elidn's
cousin's inclusion in the pejorative column of Time magazine's "Winners & Losers"
section, which identifies the people of the week whom the magazine believes deserve

recognition or reprimand. See Winners and Losers, Tam, June 12, 2000, at 21. The
write-up for Marisleysis Gonzlez, an ardent advocate for Elidn's staying in the U.S.,
scathingly reads, "Loses latest and (almost) last appeal to keep Elidn.
your 15 minutes are up[]" Id.

Get a life, girl;
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America's demography driven largely by immigration, it will be particularly important for future U.S. policy-makers to be ever mindful of
the "Elidn" among the "aliens" as the country navigates the murky
shoals of race and alienage in the twenty-first century.
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